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crisis with isis: using isis’s develoPment to analyze
“associated Forces” under the aumF
gaBrielle logaglio

introduction
Four days after the September 11th 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, the United States Congress introduced the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF).1 The bill was passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate on the same
day and was signed by President George W. Bush on September 18, 2001.2 The AUMF granted the
U.S. President the authority to use all “necessary and appropriate” force against “those responsible
for the recent attacks launched against the United States.”3 This authorization is unique in that
it allowed the President to attack those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, regardless of both who
the target is and where the target is located.4 Initially, the United States mainly used the AUMF to
attack the Taliban and al Qaeda at its bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan.5 Subsequently, as al Qaeda
expanded and developed affiliate groups, the AUMF was interpreted to include “associated forces”
of al Qaeda and the Taliban.6 This interpretation allows the President to use force against al Qaedaaffiliated armed groups, as long as the target is deemed an associated force of those responsible for
the 9/11 attacks, or al Qaeda.7 Since the AUMF does not actually contain the “associated forces”
language, the Obama Administration has drawn an analogy to the concept of co-belligerency under
the law of war.8 According to this analogy, the United States can use force against associated forces
of al Qaeda because those forces essentially amount to co-belligerents of al Qaeda.9 Whether the
law of war can be expanded to the United States’ non-international armed conflict with al Qaeda
and the Taliban is an unresolved questions that the international community is still debating about.10
1 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
2 Id.
3 Id. at § 2(a).
4 See generally Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 harv. l. rev.
2047 (2005) (explaining that the AUMF has no jurisdictional limit, allowing the President to target an individual with a
nexus to executing the 9/11 attacks anywhere in the world).
5 Id. at 2108.
6 See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D.D.C. 2009) (recognizing that the AUMF allows “associated forces”
of al Qaeda or the Taliban to also be detained under the AUMF).
7 Id.
8 Jeh Johnson, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def. Dean’s Lecture at Yale Law School “National security law, lawyers,
and lawyering in the Obama Administration” (Feb. 22, 2012) (explaining that the targeting of associated forces of al
Qaeda is rooted in the concept of co-belligerency under the law of war).
9 Id.
10 E.g. Ben Emmerson, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
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Despite the ongoing debate, the Obama Administration currently relies on a standard established
by Jeh Johnson, the current Secretary of Homeland Security, to determine which armed groups
are associated forces of al Qaeda.11 The Johnson Standard requires associated forces to have two
characteristics: (1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and (2)
is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.12
Johnson further elaborated on this standard by adding that the organization must not merely share al
Qaeda’s ideology, but must have actually entered the fight alongside al Qaeda.13
However, as al Qaeda has developed a more dispersed and nebulous network of affiliated
forces it has become increasingly difficult to apply the associated forces doctrine.14 As many of
those directly responsible for 9/11 have been either detained or killed, the Obama Administration
has increasingly relied on the Johnson Standard to attack targets considered to be associated forces
of al Qaeda, rather than members of al Qaeda itself.15 As the al Qaeda network spread, the Johnson
Standard has allowed the Obama Administration to rely on the AUMF to authorize the use force
against threats outside of the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.16 Specifically, the Obama Administration
has cited the AUMF as its authorization to use force against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in
Yemen17 and against individuals associated with al Shabaab in Somalia.18
The latest development in al Qaeda’s network is the resurgence of an al Qaeda cell in
Iraq.19 The group was initially know as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and was led by Ayman al- Zarqawi.20
Although AQI was initially successful in gaining territory, funds, and prestige inside Iraq, tensions

freedoms while countering terrorism, human rights counsel (Feb. 28, 2014) (explaining that the United States has improperly
extended co-belligerency principles to its conflict with al Qaeda); see also Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial summary or arbitrary executions, united national general assemBly (Sept. 13, 2013) (explaining that the
United States cannot use principles of co-belligerency to target associated forces of al Qaeda).
11 See Johnson, supra note 8.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 2109 (explaining that al Qaeda has expanded to a loosely connected
network of affiliated cells).
15 Rosa Brooks, Mission Creep in the War on Terror, Foreign Policy (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2013/03/14/mission_creep_in_the_war_on_terror (explaining that the United States has killed the majority of
al Qaeda and the Taliban’s senior leadership already and now the AUMF is mostly used to target franchises of al Qaeda).
16 Id. at 5.
17 Jack Goldsmith, The Growing Problem of Extra-AUMF Threats, lawFare (Sept. 30, 2010, 11:53 PM), http://www.
lawfareblog.com/2010/09/the-growing-problem-of-extra-aumf-threats/#.UvQZ7nddWGk (explaining that the United
States used the AUMF to target Al-Aulaqi and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula because the United States considered
them an associated force of al Qaeda).
18 Bill Roggio, US justified Somalia raid under AUMF, which Obama seeks to repeal, the long war Journal (Oct. 8, 2013),
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/us_justifies_somalia.php (explaining that the United States used the
AUMF’s authority to target a senior al Shabaab leader, Adbikadir Mohamed Abdikadir, in Somalia).
19 Bill Ardolino, The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Iraqnce Iraq, and in Syria, Jordan and Libya, the long war Journal (Dec. 8,
2012 4:42 PM), http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/12/the_resurgence_of_al_qaeda_in.php
(summarizing how an al Qaeda affiliate in Iraq quickly developed once US forces left Iraq).
20 Zachary Laub, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria), (Jonathan Masters ed.) council on
Foreign relations (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811.
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eventually developed between Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda’s core base and Zarqawi.21
Zarqawi was known for publicizing his brutal attacks, particularly those against Shias.22 Bin Laden
and al Qaeda’s senior leadership (AQSL) instructed Zarqawi to forgo such brutal tactics, particularly
against Shias, because they were angering the Iraqi population and turning them against al Qaeda.23
With the tensions between Zarqawi and Bin Laden unresolved, Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike
in 2006.24 Between 2006 and 2013, AQI tried to rebuild and establish a presence within Iraq.25
However, the organization was unable to make substantial gains in Iraq.26
In 2012, AQI reemerged with new leadership and a new name.27 The organization became
known as Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.28 This group
quickly gained territory in Iraq by using brutal tactics that were reminiscent of Zarqawi’s tactics.29
ISIS then expanded into Syria to aid in the rebellion against Assad.30 In Syria, tension began to build
between ISIS and another al Qaeda affiliate, al Nusra. Baghdadi announced a merger between the
two organizations, which al Nusra resisted.31 Zawahiri, the current leader of al Qaeda, annulled the
merger.32 After the attempted merger, ISIS and al Nusra began fighting each other for dominance in
the region.33 After several months of infighting and an attempt at arbitration, Zawahiri disavowed
ISIS in a statement released to a jihadist blog on February 3, 2014.34 The statement admonished
ISIS and Baghdadi for their infighting with al Nusra and their brutal and public attacks.35 Zawahiri
further asserted that al Nusra was the only al Qaeda affiliate in the region.36 After the disavowal
ISIS has successfully held onto territory inside of Iraq and continues to build up its base and expand
into new territories in Syria.37 It appears that ISIS intends to become its own, autonomous jihadist
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 M.J. Kirdar, Al Qaeda in Iraq, center For strategic & international studies; al Qaeda and associated
movement Futures ProJect 1, 5 (June 2011), http://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Kirdar_AlQaedaIraq_Web.pdf
26 Id. at 5.
27 The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Iraq, Hearing before the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcomm. and the Middle East and
North Afr. Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter The Resurgence] (statement of
Daniel L. Byman, Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy).
28 E.g., Laub, supra note 20, at 3.
29 See id. at 3 (explaining how ISIS has launches attacks against Iraqis).
30 Id. at 1.
31 Id. at 4.
32 Id.
33 See Basma Atassi, Al Qaeda Chief annuls Syrian-Iraqi Jihad merger, al Jazeera (June 9, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.
com/news/middleeast/2013/06/2013699425657882.html (explaining that ISIS and al Nusra engaged in infighting after
the annulled merger).
34 Thomas Joscelyn, Al Qaeda’s general command disowns the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham, the long war Journal
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/02/al_qaedas_general_co.php (reporting on Zawahiri’s
announcement that AQSL was no longer associated with ISIS).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See Duraid Adnan, Islamic Militants Extend Battle Into another Iraqi Province, n.y. times, Feb. 4, 2014, http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/02/06/world/middleeast/islamic-militants-extend-battle-into-another-iraqi-province.html?_r=0
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insurgency, without the al Qaeda name.
During AQI/ISIS’s development, the group fluctuated in how reliant and responsive
AQI/ISIS was to AQSL.38 Those fluctuations make it difficult to determine during which phases,
if any, the United States could use force against or detain AQI/ISIS as an associated force of al
Qaeda under the AUMF.39 This paper aims to answer whether, and at what points of AQI/ISIS’s
development, the United States could use force against or detain them under the AUMF. This will
begin with a discussion of the AUMF and its authorization to use force against and detain associated
forces of al Qaeda. This section includes a section on co-belligerency and how this concept
has informed the way the United States interpreted the AUMF to include associated forces of al
Qaeda and the Taliban. This paper then breaks AQI/ISIS’s development down into five phases
and analyzes during which of those stages AQI/ISIS could be considered an associated force of
al Qaeda, as defined by the Johnson Standard. This paper will then move to analyze whether the
Johnson Standard is useful as more semi-automatous and nebulous al Qaeda-affiliated insurgencies
develop.
The analysis of AQI’s development into ISIS reveals the repetitive nature of the twopronged Johnson Standard. In applying the Johnson Standard, it becomes readily apparent that
Johnson’s two prongs are actually one and the same. As articulated by Johnson, an associated force
of al Qaeda must be 1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and
(2) a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.40
However, when a group has joined in the fighting with al Qaeda, they have also essentially become
a co-belligerent with al Qaeda. Johnson and the Obama Administration state that they drew the
definition of associated force from the concept of co-belligerency.41 Co-belligerency is defined
as “fully fledged belligerent fighting in association with one or more belligerent powers.”42 The
language “entered the fight along side al Qaeda” and “co-belligerent of al Qaeda” is asking the
same question. It is repetitive to examine the two-prongs as separate questions. To eliminate the
repetitive language, this paper will analyze 1) whether the group is armed and organized, and 2)
whether the group has joined the fight alongside al Qaeda. By using this analysis, this paper will
eliminate the repetitive nature of the Johnson Standard and focus on the two real requirements in
the Johnson Standard.
After applying the analysis modified to each of ISIS’s five phases of development, this
paper will conclude that the Johnson Standard is not useful in allowing the United States to target
and detain groups affiliated with al Qaeda because when ISIS became threatening, the group
(explaining that ISIS has expanded into provinces neighboring Anbar); see also Memlik Pasha, ISIS Insurgents Have Almost
Surrounded Baghdad, vice news (Apr. 29, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/isis-insurgents-have-almost-surroundedbaghdad (explaining ISIS’s expansion in Iraq and Syria and ISIS’s position to invade Baghdad).
38 See Laub, supra note 20 (explaining AQI’s origins and association with al Qaeda); see also Kirdar, supra note 25
(explaining AQI’s development into ISIS and their return to reliance on al Qaeda).
39 See Karen DeYoung & Greg Miller, Al-Qaeda’s expulsion of Islamist group in Syria prompts U.S. Debate, wash. Post, Feb.
10, 2014 (explaining the debate surrounding whether ISIS can currently be considered an associated force of al Qaeda;
the disavowal by al Qaeda would indicate no, while their longstanding connections to al Qaeda indicate yes).
40 Johnson, supra note 8, at 7.
41 Id.
42 Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare, 531 (1959).
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separated from al Qaeda. If the goal of extending the AUMF to associated forces of al Qaeda
was to allow the United States to combat terrorist organizations that are affiliates of al Qaeda,
the Johnson Standard is not useful. If other al Qaeda affiliates follow a similar trajectory as ISIS,
the Johnson Standard will not be useful in allowing the United States to target or detain those
affiliated. The United States should either seek other legal authority to attack associated forces or
decide to use soft-power alternatives (such as providing aid to host states) to combat the affiliates
of al Qaeda. Although AQI began as an associated force of al Qaeda, and therefore its members
could be targeted or detained under the AUMF, this paper will illustrate how ISIS developed into an
autonomous group that could not be targeted under the AUMF. However, AQI’s development into
an autonomous group was not linear. In phase 1, AQI’s conception until 2004, the AQI did meet the
Johnson Standard for being an associated force of al Qaeda, and therefore, al Qaeda or its members
could be targeted or detained by the United States. In phase 2, as AQI became more powerful and
well-organized, the group became more autonomous and stepped away from being an associated
force of al Qaeda. In phase 3, after Zarqawi’s death in 2006, the group again weakened and was
unable to withstand attacks from U.S. forces in Iraq. By 2008, AQI’s presence in Iraq significantly
diminished until the group was no longer considered a threat.43 During phase 4 AQI resurged as
ISIS and stepped closer to being an associated force of al Qaeda. ISIS’s efforts were effective and
the group quickly grew and expanded into Syria.44 However, as ISIS gained power and no longer
needed al Qaeda for support, the group became more automatous and resisted al Qaeda’s authority
and control.45 Finally, in phase 5, ISIS’s ambitions and differing agenda from al Qaeda led al Qaeda
to disavow the group, making ISIS an autonomous insurgency and excluding ISIS from being an
associated force of al Qaeda.
AQI’s non-linear development into current ISIS, an autonomous Iraqi insurgency,
demonstrates a problem with the usefulness of the Johnson Standard; the AUMF does not allow
the United States to attack or detain affiliates of al Qaeda when they are at their most threatening
to the United States. As ISIS’s development demonstrates, when the group was weak and posed
little threat to the United States, ISIS relied more heavily on al Qaeda and was willing to submit
to al Qaeda’s authority. However, when the group gained power and became more threatening to
the United States, ISIS separated from al Qaeda and functioned more autonomously. When ISIS
is at its most threatening, it will act autonomously from al Qaeda and will therefore not be a lawful
target under the AUMF. However when the group is weaker, it will recoil and again rely on al Qaeda
for support, bringing the group closer to meeting the Johnson Standard for an associated force.
Other al Qaeda affiliates, such as Armed Islam Group, al Shabaab, and AQIM have gone through
similar patterns of only respecting al Qaeda’s authority when the group needed to rely on al Qaeda’s
funding and resources for survival.46 If other al Qaeda affiliates follow the same trajectory as ISIS,
43 See The Resurgence, supra note 27, at 124 (explaining that in 2008 AQI was significantly weakened and on the verge
of collapse).
44 Id. (explaining that ISIS quickly became the dominant insurgency in the region and potentially the most important
al Qaeda affiliate).
45 Id.
46 See generally Tricia Bacon, Foreign Policy Essay: ISIS’s rejection of al Qaeda - The End of an Era, lawFare (Feb. 16,
2014) http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/02/the-foreign-policy-essay-isiss-rejection-of-al-qaeda-the-end-of-an-era-2/
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the Johnson Standard will not allow the United States to target these groups when they are at their
most threatening. If the United States wants to combat the presence of terrorist organizations
associated with al Qaeda, the United States should either seek other legal authority (such as a new
Congressional authorization) or use soft-power alternatives to combat the group’s presence.
chaPter i: the aumF
Part 1: Passing the aumF
The AUMF was introduced to the House and the Senate and passed both Chambers on
September 14, 2001.47 The bill passed in the Senate by 98 - 0 and in the House by 420-1, with
Barbra Lee, a representative from California, being the only nay.48 Lee opposed the bill for being a
“blank check” and for giving the President an unprecedented amount of power.49 The AUMF was
signed into law on September 18, 2001, by President George W. Bush.50
The text of the AUMF gives the President authority to use force against those that the
President determines are responsible for the 9/11 attacks.51 The law contains five “whereas”
sections, a 60-word body, and a War Powers Clause. The AUMF begins by condemning the “acts of
treacherous violence” committed on 9/11 and states that it is “both necessary and appropriate that
the United States exercise its right of self-defense” in response to 9/11.52 This sentence invokes
the United States’ inherent right to self-defense, as stated in the UN Charter.53 The “whereas”
section also invokes the President’s authority to take action to deter terrorism and protect the United
States.54 The binding body of the AUMF states that the President is authorized to use all “necessary
and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or persons” that the President determines
“planned, authorized, committed, or aided” or “harbored such organizations” in the 9/11 attacks.55
Any target under the AUMF must be linked to responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. The bill then
contains a section stating that the AUMF is consistent with the War Powers Resolution and not
(discussing the Armed Islamic Group’s separation from al Qaeda for similar reasons as ISIS’s separation as well as how
al Shabaab has remained); see also William MCcants, How Zawahiri Lost al Qaeda, Foreign aFFairs (Nov. 19, 2014) http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140273/william-mccants/how-zawahiri-lost-al-qaeda (explaining how al Qaeda affiliates
have been distancing themselves from al Qaeda as they encounter more opportunities to expand in their own region);
see also Charles E. Berger, The Balkanization of Al Qaeda, the national interest (Feb. 21, 2014) http://nationalinterest.
org/commentary/the-balkanization-al-qaeda-9912 (explaining the development of Al Qaeda’s affiliates and how those
affiliates have become more distant from al Qaeda as they develop).
47 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
48 Gregory D. Johnsen, 60 Words and a War Without End: The Untold Story of the Most Dangerous Sentence in U.S. History,
BuzzFeed (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/gregorydjohnsen/60-words-and-a-war-without- end-the-untoldstory-of-the-most.
49 Id.
50 Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 U.N. Charter art. 51.
54 Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a).
55 Id.
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intended to override it.56
President Bush and his Administration initially requested broader authority under the AUMF,
but Congress was unwilling to give the President an even broader authorization.57 Initially, the Bush
Administration advocated for authority to “deter and pre-empt any future attacks of terrorism or
aggression against the United States.”58 President Bush’s initial draft of the AUMF did not contain
a 9/11 nexus, requiring those targeted under the AUMF to be responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
This authorization would have allowed the President to use pre-emptive force against terrorism
anywhere in the world, regardless of whether there was a nexus between the target and the 9/11
attacks.59 This draft would have allowed the United States to target AQI/ISIS at any point of their
development if the President determined that the use of force was necessary to deter and pre-empt
a future attack against the United States Congress pushed back and refused to grant President Bush
such a broad authorization.60 Congress rejected the Bush Administration’s version for the current
wording of the AUMF, leaving the requirement of a nexus to the 9/11 attacks in place.
Passing the AUMF as a Congressional authorization, rather than an executive order, gave
the President’s actions more credibility.61 There is some debate as to whether the President could
have acted unilaterally, without Congressional authorization, to retaliate in self-defense against those
responsible for the 9/11 attacks.62 Presidential actions often lack Congressional authorization.63
Here, Congress specifically authorized the use of force for the individuals responsible for the 9/11
attacks. Separate from U.S. domestic law, the United Nations Charter specifically allows a state to
use self-defense in response to an armed attack under international law.64 By invoking self-defense
language in the AUMF, the Bush Administration was relying on principles already established in
international law to authorize the use of force against al Qaeda and the Taliban.65
Part 2: limits on the aumF’s usage
The 9/11 clause in the AUMF gives the President discretion to determine the method of
attack, the target of the attack, and the location of the attack if the target can be linked back to
the 9/11 attacks.66 Although the AUMF describes the target, it does not specify the target or the
56 Id. at §2(b).
57 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 2079.
58 Jennifer Daskal & Steve Vladeck, After the AUMF: a Response to Cheney, Goldsmith, Waxman and Wittes, lawFare
(Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/after-the-aumf/ (quoting the Bush Administration’s proposed
language for the AUMF).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 2050-51 (“[P]residential wartime acts not authorized by Congress lack the
same presumption of validity”).
62 Id.
63 See id. (explaining that for most of the U.S history, significant military engagements have been initiated without
congressional authorization, i.e. the Korean War and the Kosovo bombing campaign).
64 See U.N. Charter, supra note 53.
65 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 2050-51.
66 See id. at 2080-81 (explaining that the AUMF contains no additional limits on targets).
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geographic location.67 Subsequently, as the AUMF has been interpreted to include the associated
forces of al Qaeda and the Taliban. As a result, the AUMF has lost some specificity and has been
interpreted more broadly, even though the 9/11 nexus remains in place. This section will first
address the methods of force that can be used, including where the United States can use force,
and who can be targeted under the AUMF. This paper will then address how the concept of cobelligerency, from the law of war, was used to interpret the AUMF to include associated forces of al
Qaeda and the Taliban, thus expanding who could be targeted or detained under the AUMF.
The AUMF gives the President discretion to choose the method, location, and target of the
use of force, as long as the target can be linked back to those responsible for the 9/11 attacks.68 The
AUMF places no explicit limits on the methods of attack that the President may use to target those
responsible for the 9/11 attacks.69 The AUMF dictates that the President may use all “necessary and
appropriate force.”70 Aside from previously standing international law, the language of the AUMF
places no limits on the President’s resources or methods in launching attacks.71 The U.S. Supreme
Court has interpreted this language to include all typical types of wartime measures, specifically
stating that the AUMF authorizes the President to detain those suspected of aiding in the 9/11
attacks.72 The Department of Justice has also interpreted the “necessary and appropriate force”
language to allow for the use of unmanned drone strikes against those responsible for the 9/11
attacks or their associated forces.73 The AUMF authorizes the President to use any methods or
resources to target or detain those responsible for the 9/11 attacks as long as it comports with the
“necessary and appropriate force” language contained within the AUMF.
The AUMF contains no geographical limit on where the President may launch an attack
or detain an individual.74 The AUMF describes who can be targeted and does not name a specific
state or region against which the President may use force.75 The language of the AUMF implies that
the President may launch an attack anywhere in the world as long as the target of the attack can be
linked back to culpability in the 9/11 attacks.76 The President has discretion to use force wherever
he determines that a valid target is located.
The AUMF does not specify who may be targeted under the AUMF; the only requirement
is that the target be linked back to responsibility for the 9/11 attacks.77 The AUMF authorizes the
President to use force against any “nation, organization, or persons” that the President determines

67 Id. at 2082.
68 Id. at 2080-82.
69 Id. at 2078-79.
70 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
71 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 2078-79.
72 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
73 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Dep’t of Justice White Paper: Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who
is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an Associated Force, Draft, (Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.
com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_WhitePaper.pdf.
74 See Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a).
75 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 2082.
76 Id. at 2079-80.
77 Id.
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“planned, authorized, committed or aided” in the 9/11 attacks.78 Of the “nation, organization, or
persons” language, “persons” has been the most problematic to interpret.79 Typically authorizations
to use force are against states, making this part of the authorization not unusual or problematic.80
Authorizations to use force do not usually authorize force against specific persons, which is not
unusual or problematic.81 The greatest difficulty in allowing specific individuals to be targeted is
in determining what level of support or membership a person detained under the AUMF must
have provided to al Qaeda.82 The President resolved this dilemma requiring that an individual
provide “material support” to al Qaeda or the Taliban against the United States or its coalition
partners in order to be detained under the AUMF.83 Individuals can only be targeted with lethal
force under the AUMF when they are members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or an associated force.84
The term “organizations” has been defined to include core al Qaeda and the Taliban.85 Including
“organizations” in the AUMF allows the President to target new members of al Qaeda and the
Taliban and members that were not apart of the planning or execution of the 9/11 attacks.86
These individuals could not be targeted under the “persons” language of the AUMF because they,
as individuals, do not have a nexus to the 9/11 attacks.87 However, by targeting them as being
a member of an organization that does have a nexus to the 9/11 attacks, the United States may
target new generations of core al Qaeda under the AUMF.88 The AUMF gives the President broad
discretion to determine who or which organizations can be targeted under the AUMF.89
Finally, the AUMF contains no end date or sunset clause, allowing it to exist until Congress
takes action to repeal the bill.90 Congress must take affirmative action to repeal the AUMF.91 Even
now that the threat from al Qaeda (and those individuals responsible for the 9/11 attacks) has
subsided, the AUMF remains in force until Congress takes action to repeal or amend it.92 Although
there have been proposals to repeal the AUMF or set a sunset date, these bills have been unable to
garner support in either chamber. Most recently, Representative Adam Schiff introduced a bill that

78 See Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a).
79 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 2107-11 (arguing that persons who were not involved with 9/11 may stay
fall under the AUMF for belonging to associated organizations).
80 See Id. at 2107-11.
81 See Id. at 2108.
82 See Id.
83 See Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C.§ 47 (2009) (concluding that an individual will be targeted if they
provide “material support or resources” to a terrorist organization).
84 Id.
85 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 2107-11 (arguing that persons who were not involved with 9/11 may still
fall under the AUMF for belonging to associated organizations).
86 Id. at 2109.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 2109-10.
89 Id. at 2082.
90 See Johnsen, supra note 48 (stating that when Congress drafted this legislation no one looked ahead to when the war
would end so they failed to set a day in which the legislation would end).
91 Id.
92 Id.
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would sunset the AUMF by 2015, however, it was initially defeated in the House.93 President Obama
has publicly stated that al Qaeda is on the “path of defeat” and he looked forward to repealing the
AUMF.94 Currently, a year after President Obama’s statement, he has made no efforts to repeal
the AUMF.95 In a Senate hearing on May 20, 2014, the President was criticized by law makers for
making no efforts to repeal the AUMF.96 Representative Schliff has reintroduced his bill to sunset
the AUMF by 2015 and it was debated in the House on May 20, 2014.97
Part 3: co-Belligerency and the inclusion the “associated Forces” to the aumF
As al Qaeda developed affiliates in other countries, the United States has interpreted the
AUMF to allow for the use of forces against “associated forces” of al Qaeda and the Taliban.98 The
associated forces language does not actually appear in the text of the AUMF.99 The United States
sought legal authority as the basis for including associated forces under the AUMF.100 The United
States has relied on the concept of co-belligerency, which is already established in international law,
in including associated forces of al Qaeda and the Taliban under the AUMF.101 Although principles
of co-belligerency are firmly established under the law of war, the concept had not previously been
applied to a non-state actor and its affiliates.102 Scholars and practitioners alike have questioned
whether the United States has overextended the concept of co-belligerency in reading the AUMF
to include associated forces of al Qaeda and the Taliban.103 Despite a lack of precedent, the United
93 Sunset to the Authorization for Use of Military Force Act, H.R. Res. 2324, 113th Cong. (2013).
94 President Barack Obama, Address at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013).
95 Karen DeYoung, Obama’s Revamp of anti-terror policies stalls, wash. Post, May 21, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/2014/05/21/79ac0f20-e053-11e3-8dcc-d6b7fede081a_story.html (criticizing the Obama
Administration for not taking steps to repeal the AUMF).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See Brooks, supra note 15 (arguing that once the United States had targeted or detained a majority of those
responsible for the 9/11 attacks, the United States then expanded the AUMF to include associated forces, who were
more attenuated from the 9/11 perpetrators).
99 See Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a) (showing no language of “associated forces” in the AUMF); see
also Johnson, supra note 8 (explaining that the phrase “associated forces” language is not in the AUMF).
100 See Brooks, supra note 15 (explaining how the “associated forces” language was slowly included into how the
AUMF is interpreted).
101 See Johnson, supra note 8 (explaining that the definition of “associated forces of Al Qaeda are groups that amount
to co-belligerents of Al Qaeda).
102 Kevin Jon Heller, The ACLU/CCR Reply Brief in Al-Aulaqi (and My Reply to Wittes), oPinio Juris (Oct. 9, 2010),
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/10/09/the-acluccr-reply-brief-in-al-aulaqi-and-my-reply-to-wittes/ (arguing that cobelligerency only exists in an international armed conflict and cannot be applied to a non- international armed conflict).
103 See generally Emmerson, supra note 10 (critiquing the United States for using co-belligerency principles to
target al Qaeda); see also Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial summary or arbitrary executions,
united national general assemBly (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Executions/Pages/
SRExecutionsIndex.aspx (explaining that the United States cannot use principles of co-belligerency to target associated
forces of al Qaeda); see Kevin Jon Heller, D.C. Circuit Rejected “Co-Belligerency” in Al-Bihani, oPinio Juris (Oct. 17,
2010), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/10/17/dc-circuit-rejects-co-belligerency (arguing that the D.C. court rejected the
government’s use of co-belligerency principles); see Jack Goldsmith, The D.C. Circuit Has Not Rejected Co-Belligerency,

Vol. 5, No. 1

Crisis With isis

137

States readily drew an analogy between traditional co-belligerency between states and al Qaeda’s
relationship with affiliated armed groups.104 The United States used this analogy to define the
Johnson definition of an associated force of al Qaeda or the Taliban.105 To fully understand the
debate surrounding the United States’ use of co-belligerency principles, this section will first discuss
how co-belligerency functions under the law of war. With that understanding, this section will
analyze how the United States has incorporated those ideas into defining the associated forces of al
Qaeda and the Taliban and outline the critiques of the United States’ application of co-belligerency
to groups affiliated with al Qaeda.
Under international law, there are two general types of armed conflicts, international armed
conflicts (IACs) and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).106 The International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) has defined IACs as conflicts with two or more opposing states.107 The ICRC
has defined NIACs as armed conflicts between governmental forces and non-governmental armed
groups or between only non-governmental armed groups.108 The law of war, including the Geneva
Conventions, governs IACs.109 NIACs are not as well defined and subsequently are not are as strictly
governed under international law.110 Co-belligerency is well-defined and incorporated into the law
of war governing IACs. A co-belligerent is a state that has entered a conflict alongside another
belligerent, itself becoming a belligerent and a party to the conflict.111 A co-belligerent state is a
“fully fledged belligerent fighting in association with one or more belligerent powers.”112 According
to the ICRC Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions, co-belligerency can be demonstrated
through a de facto relationship” that “may find expression merely by tacit agreement,” if the
operations are such as to indicate clearly for which side the belligerent organization is fighting.113
While an IAC is taking place, a third-party state’s breach of neutrality (such as providing soft
support to the enemy state) is not enough to render the third-party a co-belligerent.114 A third-party
must join the belligerent in the fight and must be fighting in association with the belligerent in order
to amount to a co-belligerent.
lawFare (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/10/the-d-c-circuit-has-not-rejected-co-belligerency
(arguing that the D.C Circuit Court is relying on co-belligerency principles in determining the associated forces of Al
Qaeda).
104 See Johnson, supra note 8 (drawing an analogy between co-belligerency and the groups that the United States
deems associated forces of Al Qaeda).
105 Id.
106 How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law, International committee oF the red
cross (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
107 Id. at 1.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1-2.
110 See Rebecca Ingber, Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the Conflict with al-Qaeda, 47 tex. int’l l.J. 75, 81 (2011)
(explaining that NIACs are more difficult to define because the concept of the “enemy is murky).
111 See id. at 90 (explaining that under the concept of co-belligerency, a state may enter the conflict along side a
belligerent, therefore becoming a co-belligerent).
112 See Greenspan, supra note 42.
113 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4A (commentary), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
135.
114 See Ingber, supra note 110, at 96.
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During an IAC, a state may use force against a co-belligerent of its enemy without an
additional authorization or declaration of war.115 For example, when Vichy France entered into
World War II alongside Germany, the U.S. President did not need additional authorization to use
force against this new party to the conflict because it was considered an ally or co-belligerent of
Germany.116 However, any use of force against a co-belligerent is still constrained by the law of war
and Jus in Bello principles of necessity, distinction, and proportionality.117
Although co-belligerency is well defined in IACs, co-belligerency has not been as readily
extended to NIACs. Co-belligerency has its roots in state-centric neutrality law.118 Neutrality law
addresses the rights and responsibilities of states that are not enemies in a conflict. Each state has
an obligation to remain neutral while an IAC is taking place.119 Remaining neutral means that a
third-party must not support one party to a conflict over another.120 Small infringements are not
sufficient to turn a third-party into a co-belligerent.121 However, if a party joins a belligerent in the
conflict, they will be breaking their own neutrality and become a co-belligerent to the conflict.122
Neutrality law only binds states.123 Individuals or organizations are free to provide support to a
belligerent in a conflict without it violating their host state’s neutrality.124 Since neutrality law is an
inter-state concept, it remains unclear to what extent it can be applied to non-state actors in a noninternational armed conflict.125
Despite the uncertainties surrounding how co-belligerency may or may not extend to
NIACs, the Obama Administration has readily implemented principles of co-belligerency in reading
the AUMF to authorize the United States to target and detain associated forces of al Qaeda and the
Taliban.126 The Supreme Court of the United States determined that the United States is engaged
in a NIAC with al Qaeda and the Taliban.127 However, as al Qaeda has developed affiliated cells
in other countries, the United States has read the AUMF to also authorize the United States to use
force against associated forces of al Qaeda and the Taliban.128 Since the associated forces language
does not appear in the AUMF itself, the Obama Administration has drawn an analogy to co115 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 2111-12.
116 Id.
117 See Ingber, supra note 110, at 81-83 (explaining that jus in bello must operate with the “principle of humanity”).
118 Id. at 88.
119 Id.
120 See id. at 86-87 (explaining that the law of neutrality requires neutral states to not participate in a conflict and
remain impartial to all involved parties, including not giving resources to a party in the conflict).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 87-88.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 88.
126 See Johnson, supra note 8 (drawing an analogy between the concept of co-belligerency and al Qaeda’s relationship
with its affiliates to justify targeted associated forces of al Qaeda under the AUMF).
127 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629–32 (2006) (holding that the United States is in a NIAC with al Qaeda
because the conflict “does not involve a clash between nations”).
128 See Brooks, supra note 15 (arguing that the US has expanded the AUMF to include associated forces, who were
more attenuated from the 9/11 perpetrators).
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belligerency for its authority to attack associated forces of al Qaeda.129 According to the analogy,
since the law of war allows a state to attack a co-belligerent of its enemy, the law surrounding
NIACs similarly allows the United States to target and detain those organizations that have joined
al Qaeda and the Taliban in their conflict with the United States.130 The Johnson Standard even
requires that the actor be a “co-belligerent” of al Qaeda or the Taliban to determine whether an
organization is an associated force.131 Both the Federal Courts and Congress have recognized that
the AUMF authorizes the United States to detain associated forces of those responsible for 9/11.132
Despite the Federal Courts recognition that the AUMF allows the United States to detain
associated forces of al Qaeda, there is a debate within the courts on whether an associated force
essentially amounts to a co-belligerent.133 In Hamlily, the court held that the government has the
authority to detain members of the associated forces of al Qaeda as long as those forces would be
considered co-belligerents under the law of war.134 The court stated, “Like many other elements
of the law of war, co-belligerency is a concept that has developed almost exclusively in the context
of international armed conflicts. However, there is no reason why this principle is not equally
applicable to non-state actors involved in non-international conflicts.”135 The Hamlily Court
acknowledges that co-belligerency is not inherent to NIACs, but decides that there is no reason not
to expand co-belligerency to NIACs.136
Conversely, the Al-Bihani court described the government’s attempt to apply co-belligerency
to a non-state actor as “folly,” arguing that the law surrounding state-based conflicts (IACs) cannot
be applied to a conflict involving non-state actors.137 The Al-Bihani court ultimately held that the law
of war could not constrain U.S. domestic law.138 The court held that Al-Bihani could be detained
under the AUMF for his s membership in a group that supported the Taliban, regardless of what
the law of war permitted.139 The court found no legal basis to expand co-belligerency to a non-state
actor.140
129 See Johnson, supra note 8 (concluding that the United States is allowed to ultimately target and detain organizations
that have joined Al Qaeda and the Taliban).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that the United States can detain associated
forces of al Qaeda if those forces amount to co-belligerents); see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012, Pub.L. No. 112–81, § 1021(b)(2). 125 Stat. 1298 (Dec. 31, 2011).
133 See id. at 75 (interpreting “associated forces” of al Qaeda to mean co-belligerents as the term is understood under
the law of war); but see Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that principles, like co-belligerency,
that are based in the law of war, cannot be applied to NIACs).
134 See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. at 78 (holding that the President may detain an individual who has committed or
participated in a belligerent act to help in aiding enemy combatants).
135 Id. at 74.
136 Id.
137 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
138 See Jack Goldsmith, The D.C. Circuit Has Not Rejected Co-Belligerency, lawFare (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.
lawfareblog.com/2010/10/the-d-c-circuit-has-not-rejected-co-belligerency (explaining that the Presiding Judge in AlBihani did not reject applying co-belligerency in NIACs, but instead intended it to not limit the AUMF’s authority).
139 Al Bihani, 590 F.3d at 885.
140 Id. at 873.
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While some scholars agree with the United States’ analogy to co-belligerency in the
conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban, there is also doubt as to whether the principle can be so
easily extended to NIACs.141 On one hand, Goldsmith and Bradley argue that the United States
has properly expanded co-belligerency to extend to NIACs.142 They argue that associated forces
that “participate with al Qaeda in acts of war against the U.S. or systematically provided military
resources to al Qaeda” amount to co-belligerents of al Qaeda and can be targeted and detained
under the AUMF.143 However, on the other side of the debate, there is significant doubt as to
whether a principle based state-centric law of war can be extended to NIACs, where one party is not
a state.144 Scholars in opposition to Bradley and Goldsmith argue that there is no justification for the
government to import the concept of co-belligerency to a NIAC and that incorporating the concept
of co-belligerency to NIACs would expand the law surrounding NIACs too broadly without placing
any clear limits on how the concept would be applied.145
Two United Nations reports challenge whether the concept of co-belligerency can be
extended to NIACs, particularly, in the United States’ conflict with al Qaeda. First, the Report of
the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (Heyns Report) concludes
that in a NIAC where individual targets are not a part of the same command or control structure
as the non-state actor or are not a part of a singular military structure, the individual should not be
viewed as part of the same group, even if the two groups are associated.146 The report implies that
the United States cannot target individuals that are members of groups that are associated with al
Qaeda unless the group has an integrated command structure with al Qaeda.147 The Heyns Report
specifically states that many of the non-state actors that currently associate with al Qaeda do not
possess the integrated command structure with al Qaeda that would justify considering them the
same actor participating in a NIAC.148 Heyns concludes that a state can only attack an associated
force when the intensity of violence between the associated force and the state crosses the intensity
threshold for creating a separate NIAC.149 The Heyns Report concludes that the concept of cobelligerency cannot be expanded to NIACs because to do so would open the door too broadly and
expand whom a state could target without clear limits.150
The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (Emmerson Report) reached a similar
conclusion as the Heyns Report. First, the Emmerson Report concluded that to use force against an
armed non-state actor located in another state, a state must obtain consent from the host state, the
actions of the non-state actor must be attributable to the host state, or the Security Council must
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 2111-13; see Heller, supra note 103.
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 2111-13.
Id. at 2113.
See, e.g., Heller, supra note 103 (arguing that co-belligerency can not exit in non-international armed conflict).
Id.
See Heyns, supra note 103, at 17-18.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
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pre-approve the action.151 If none of these conditions are met, a state has unlawfully violated the
sovereignty of the host state.152 While the United States has asserted that its right to self-defense
entitles the to United States to engage in non-consensual military operations against armed groups,
the Emmerson Report concludes that international law does not allow this.153 Further, the report
requires that a non-state actor have an integrated command structure or launch joint military
operations to be considered either an associated force or a co-belligerent of al Qaeda.154 This
standard is similar to the Heyns Report. The Emmerson Report doubts that the United States has
properly applied principles of co-belligerency to the al Qaeda affiliates.155
Despite the ongoing debate surrounding whether the concept of co-belligerency can be
extended to NIACs and the UN reports rejecting that al Qaeda affiliated groups can amount to
co-belligerents, the United States is still targeting and detaining members of associated forces of al
Qaeda under the AUMF.156 Given the controversy in expanding the AUMF to include associated
forces, the United States has had a difficult time in defining which of al Qaeda’s affiliates amount to
co-belligerents or associated forces of al Qaeda. The next section discusses how the United States
extended the AUMF to cover associated forces of al Qaeda and the Taliban and how the United
States has determined which groups qualify as associated forces under the AUMF.
Part 4: the inclusion oF associated Forces into the aumF
Currently, many of those responsible for the 9/11 attacks have either been killed or
detained and the AUMF is largely used to target the associated forces of al Qaeda.157 The inclusion
of “associated forces” in the AUMF is a more recent development that developed through later
interpretation of the AUMF. Although the inclusion of associated forces of al Qaeda under the
AUMF is based on principles of co-belligerency, the associated forces doctrine has gained its own
basis and definition in domestic law through the Obama Administration, Congress, and the Federal
Courts.158
As mentioned in the above section, the Federal Courts first recognized that associated forces

151 Emmerson, supra note 10, at 14-16.
152 Id. at 16.
153 Id.
154 See id. at 19 (questioning whether an associated force must have an operational connection with the host state in
order to invoke the international law principle of self defense).
155 See id. (arguing that the United States interpretations of international legal principles run contrary to international
consensus).
156 See Johnson, supra note 8 (justifying the United State’s use of co-belligerency in defining the associated forces of al
Qaeda).
157 See Brooks, supra note 15 (explaining that the United States has killed the majority of al Qaeda and the Taliban’s
senior leadership already and now the AUMF is mostly used to target franchises of al Qaeda).
158 See generally Johnson, supra note 8 (explaining the Obama Administration definition of associated forces); see also
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–81, 125 Stat. 1298 § 1021(b) (2011); Hamlily,
supra note 6.
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of al Qaeda could be included in the AUMF in Hamlily v. Obama.159 In Hamlily, the District Court
held that the AUMF authorized the United States to detain individuals that were “part of ” the forces
of organizations that could be targeted under the AUMF.160 The court further held that the United
States could detain members of “associated forces” of the organizations that could be targeted
or detained under the AUMF.161 The court held that the AUMF did not permit the government
to detain individuals who provided “substantial support” to, but were not a “part of,” a targeted
organization.162 Despite the court’s recognition of the inclusion of associated forces, the court did
not specifically define “associated forces.”163 Judge Bates, the presiding judge of the Hamlily court
only defined “associated forces” as forces that must be actually associated with al Qaeda or the
Taliban within their current conflict with the United States, not simply terrorist organization that
share the same philosophy or common purpose as al Qaeda.164 The Hamlily opinion was the first
explicit affirmation that the AUMF extended to the associated forces of al Qaeda and the Taliban.
After the Hamlily opinion, Congress recognized that the AUMF authorized the United States
to use force against al Qaeda, the Taliban and their associated forces in 2011.165 In 2011, the House
Armed Services Committee approved a measure entitled Affirmation of Armed Conflict with Al-Qaeda,
the Taliban, and Associated Forces (Affirmation).166 This measure affirmed that the United States is:
[E]ngaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated forces” and that the President has the authority to use all
necessary and appropriate force during the current armed conflict
with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces Pursuant to the
167
Authorization for Use of Military force.
Although this affirmation is not binding law, it is still the first time that Congress explicitly
recognized that the United States could use force against the associated forces of al Qaeda under the
AUMF. The Affirmation did not define or provide any criteria for “associated forces.”
Both Congress and the Federal Courts left it to the President to determine how to define
“associated forces.” Neither the Hamlily court nor the Affirmation provided a workable and practical
159 See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. at 62 (explaining the Federal CourtsAct for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub.L. No. 112rces); 1021(b)
(2).
160 See id. at 70 (recognizing that the court allows individuals that were e No of ” legally targeted organizations to also
be detained under the AUMF).
161 See id. (showing that the scope of who can be detained under the AUMF had expanded).
162 See id. (explaining the limit the court set on who can be detained under the AUMF).
163 See Goldsmith, supra note 17 (explaining that Judge Bates’ definition of associated forces does not speak to what
level of association an affiliate must have to and does not address the groups that are cooperative while having their own
agenda).
164 See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. at 75 (explaining the Court decision to limit the scope of the AUMF with regards to
associated forces).
165 See National Defense Authorization Act for 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong., §1034 (2011) (showing Congressional
affirmation of the Hamlily opinion).
166 See id. (referring to the title of the approved measure).
167 See id. at §1034(1)-(2).
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definition for determining which organizations were associated forces of al Qaeda.168 The President
was left to come to his own determination on which organizations were included as associated
forces under the AUMF. Although the associated forces language was not approved by the Hamlily
court until after the Bush Administration left office, their definitions of who could be targeted
under the AUMF preceded the Obama Administration’s policies towards the AUMF.169 The Obama
Administration drafted policies that were similar to the Bush Administration policies on who could
be either targeted or detained under the AUMF and how they would define associated forces of al
Qaeda and the Taliban.170
The Bush Administration did not define associated forces, but allowed individuals and
organizations to be targeted for providing “support” to al Qaeda or the Taliban.171 The Bush
Administration initially relied on the AUMF and, as an alternative, the President’s Article II powers
to detain members of both al Qaeda and the Taliban.172 However, by 2005 the Bush Administration
relied on the AUMF alone to target and detain individuals that were members of or provided
support to al Qaeda and the Taliban.173 On November 13th, 2001, President Bush issued The
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against Terrorism Order, (Order) which
defined who, in the conflict against al Qaeda and The Taliban, was considered an enemy combatant
and who could be detained or targeted.174 This Order included individuals who were either currently
or previously members of al Qaeda and:
[A]ided or abetted, or conspired to commit acts of international
terrorism, or act in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to
cause, or have as their aim to cause injury to or adverse effects on the
United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy or economy.175
The Order also included those who harbored anyone who fit the above criteria.176 Individuals that
168 See Goldsmith, supra note 17 (explaining that Judge Bates’ definition of associated forces does not speak to what
level of association an affiliate must have to and does not address the groups that are cooperative while having their own
agenda); see also National Defense Authorization Act (providing no definition or criteria for an associated forces of al
Qaeda).
169 See generally, Jack Goldsmith, Detention, the AUMF, and the Bush Administration- Correcting the Record, lawFare (Sep.
14, 2010), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/09/detention-the-aumf-and-the-bush-administration-correcting-therecord/#.UvVX8nddWGk (explaining the differences between the Bush Administration policy on targeting individual
under the AUMF and the Obama Administration policy and that Obama embraced many of the Bush Administration
policies).
170 See id. (comparing Bush and Obama policies regarding targeting under the AUMF).
171 See id. (explaining that the Bush Administration interpreted the AUMF to allow the US to dean those who
“support” terrorist groups).
172 See id. (arguing that although the Bush Administration did rely on its Article II power as an alternative to the
AUMF for detention authority).
173 See id. (showing the President’s reliance on the AUMF to justify targeting methods).
174 See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833
(Nov. 13, 2001) (specifying the criteria for targeting and detention).
175 See id.
176 See id. (showing the addition of reliance on the AUMF to justify taa to be targeted).

144

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 5, No. 1

fit into the above criteria were considered enemy combatants and could be targeted or detained.177
The Bush Administration used “enemy combatant” language and detained and tried “enemy
combatants” by military commission under the President’s war powers.178 Although this Order was
written before either Congress or the courts had used the “associated forces” language to target
affiliates of al Qaeda under the AUMF, this Order defined co-belligerents and informed who was
considered an associated with al Qaeda.179
Although the Obama Administration abandoned the enemy combatant language that the
Bush Administration had relied on, there was not a significant change in the way the AUMF was
applied.180 In 2009, United States Attorney General, Eric Holder issued a statement that the Obama
Administration would stop using the enemy combatant language and the Obama Administration
would stop using the enemy combatant language and the “support” standard that the Bush
Administration had used to determine who could be detained under the AUMF.181 In 2010, the
Obama Administration determined that the AUMF authorized the detention of “persons who were
part of, or substantially supported, the Taliban, or al Qaeda, or its associated forces.”182 Although
this standard reads as a higher bar than the Bush Administration standard of just providing
“support” for al Qaeda, the two standards were applied similarly and there was no significant
difference between them.183 Further, the Obama Administration did not define who was considered
an associated force of al Qaeda until 2012.184 Although the Obama Administration decided to forgo
the Bush Administration language, the Obama Administration did not issue significantly different
policies as to who could be detained under the AUMF.
In the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Obama Administration
solidified its definition of associated forces of al Qaeda or the Taliban by codifying its own
standard.185 The NDAA affirmed the United States’ authority to detain persons covered by the
AUMF. The Act defined a covered person as either:
(1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
those responsible for this attacks, (2) a person who was part of or
substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban or associated forces
177 See id.
178 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 §948b (2006) (explaining the use of
the term “enemy combatant” to try detained persons).
179 See id. § 948a(1) (showing the relation between the Order and the Military Commissions Act).
180 See Goldsmith, supra note 17 (explaining the Obama Administrationen interpretation of AUMF).
181 See Randall Mikkelsen, Guantanamo Inmates no Longer “Enemy Combatants”, reuters (Mar. 14, 2009), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2009/03/14/us-obama-security-combatant-idUSTRE52C59220090314?sp=true (demonstrating the
Obama Administration’s intentions of moving away from the Bush Administration interpretation of the AUMF).
182 See Goldsmith, supra note 17.
183 See id. (comparing interpretations and practices of the AUMF between the two Administrations).
184 See Johnson, supra note 8 (defining the criteria for an associated force of al Qaeda).
185 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–81, 125 Stat. 1298 § 1021(b) (2011)
(demonstrating that Congress accepted the Obama Administration definition of associated forces by passing legislation
using similar language).
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that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or
has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces. 186
The NDAA set out a standard determining if a terrorist organization is an associated force of al
Qaeda. Jeh Johnson further clarified this criterion during a Dean’s Lecture at Yale Law School.187
Johnson, who was General Counsel to the Department of Defense (DOD) at the time of the
speech, explained that an associated force of al Qaeda had two defining characteristics: 1) there
must be an organization or armed group that has entered the fight alongside al Qaeda, and 2) the
group must be a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners. Johnson went on to explain that the group must not simply be aligned with al Qaeda, it
must have also entered in the fight against the United States or its coalition partners.188 A group that
merely embraces the al Qaeda ideology cannot be considered an associated force under the Johnson
Standard.189
The Obama Administration has relied on the associated forces addition to the AUMF to
target al Qaeda affiliated organizations throughout the Middle East and into North Africa. To
summarize Janet Napolitano’s testimony to Congress, the problem with al Qaeda is that it inspires
affiliates, but that inspiration is not enough to consider that group an associated force of al Qaeda.190
Since pure inspiration from al Qaeda is not enough, the Obama Administration has stuck to the
Johnson Standard, relying on the idea of co-belligerency to determine which of al Qaeda’s affiliates
are considered associated forces.191 The Obama Administration views Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) as an associated force of al Qaeda and has used drone strikes to target AQAP
members in Yemen.192 The Obama Administration targeted a member of al Shabaab, based in
Somalia.193 However, the United States targeted the member of al Shabaab due to his association
with al Qaeda, rather than targeting based on al Shabaab’s association with al Qaeda.194 It is not clear
whether the Obama Administration considers al Shabaab an associated force of al Qaeda.195 At a
Senate hearing in May 2013, Department of Defense officials stated that the AUMF authorized the
use of force against terrorist organizations in Libya and Syria.196 Specifically, the official stated that
he considered al Nusra, an al Qaeda affiliate in Syria, an associated force of al Qaeda and that the
186 See id.
187 See Johnson, supra note 8 (explaining the concept of a for an associated force of al Qaeda).
188 See id. (offering further clarification on the definition of d by courts).
189 See id. (explaining limits of the Johnson standard).
190 See Goldsmith, supra note 17 (explaining the Administration’s rational on limiting who is considered an “associated
force”).
191 See Johnson, supra note 8 (explaining the concept of co-belligerency as stricter standard than mere inspiration).
192 See Goldsmith, supra note 17 (providing an example of co-belligerency).
193 See generally Roggio, supra note 18 (explaining the targeting of a non-al Qaeda member under the AUMF).
194 See id. (explaining individual association rather than group association).
195 But see Jennifer Daskal & Steve Vladeck, Westgate, al Shabaab, and the AUMF, Just security (Sep. 23, 2013), http://
justsecurity.org/930/westgate-al-shabaab-aumf/ (Showing inconsistency of application of AUMF).
196 See Johnsen, supra note 48 (demonstrating the Administration extending the AUMF to other organizations in Syria
and Libya).
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United States has the authority to attack if al Nusra becomes a security threat.197 He stated that the
President had the domestic authority to put boots on the ground in both Yemen and the Congo,
however, he later recanted and said that this authority was not necessarily from the AUMF.198 The
United States’ action in Yemen and Somalia and the DOD’s testimony at the Senate hearing show
that the Obama Administration has a broad view of which organizations are associated forces of al
Qaeda.199
During the Senate hearing in May 2013, several Senators expressed their disagreement with
both the AUMF and with the President’s reliance on the associated forces doctrine.200 Specifically,
Senator John McCain disagreed with the DOD’s assertion that the AUMF did not need to be
updated.201 Senator McCain called for the AUMF to be updated to reflect the current state of
the al Qaeda threat.202 Senator Angus King took issue with the President’s use of the AUMF to
attack associated forces of al Qaeda when that language does not appear anywhere in the AUMF.203
Overall, the Senate hearing revealed that the Obama Administration does not feel restrained by the
AUMF and that the Senate oversight committee was kept out of the loop in determining which
organizations are associated forces of al Qaeda.204
Following the Senate hearing, President Obama made several pledges to reform the AUMF.
Speaking to the National Defense University on May 23, 2013, President Obama made three pledges
regarding the AUMF: 1) he pledged to engage Congress about the AUMF and to determine how to
continue to fight terrorism without keeping America in perpetual war, 2) he pledged to not sign a
law to expand the AUMF any further, and 3) he stated that he looks forward to helping to refine and
ultimately repeal the AUMF.205 However, since giving that speech the Obama Administration has
taken no active steps to achieve any of these three pledges.206 Further, in October 2013, only a few
months after this speech, the Obama Administration launched a raid on a senior al Shabaab leader
in Somalia under the AUMF.207 The Obama Administration is still actively relying on the AUMF’s
authority and the Administration may not want to sunset the AUMF and constrain the President’s
ability to use forces against threatening al Qaeda affiliates.
197 See Jack Goldsmith, Congress Must Figure Out What Our Government Is Doing In The Name of the AUMF, lawFare
(May 17, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/congress-must-figure-out-what-our-government-is-doing-in-thename-of-the-aumf/#.UvVGwHddWGn (explaining reasoning for applying the AUMF to al Nusra).
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 See Johnsen, supra note 48 (explaining lack of unanimity regarding applying the AUMF to the current conflict in
Iraq and Syria).
201 See id. (explaining the McCain disagreement on how to legally use force in Syria and Iraq).
202 See id. (arguing that the current AUMF cannot be extended to individuals or organizations in Syria and Iraq).
203 See id. (demonstrating that the language of the AUMF needs to be less ambiguous).
204 See Goldsmith, supra note 197 (explaining political conflict behind the legal arguments regarding the AUMF).
205 See President Barack Obama, supra note 94 (explaining the political compromises the Administration promised to
make before taking action).
206 See DeYoung, supra note 95 (explaining that the President has not taken any steps to fulfill the three pledges made
during his National Defense University Speech).
207 See Roggio, supra note 18 (demonstrating that the Administration will act regardless of political debates
surrounding the AUMF).
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chaPter ii: isis as an associated Force oF al Qaeda
Keeping in mind the development of the AUMF, specifically the associated forces doctrine,
this paper will now analyze how and when the AUMF applies to al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) at various
points in its history. The development of the Iraqi al Qaeda affiliate has been broken up into five
phases. Each phase will be described and then the Johnson Standard will be applied to determine
if the organization could be targeted under the AUMF. As discussed earlier, rather than applying
each prong of the Johnson Standard verbatim, this paper will analyze the two core requirements
expressed in the Johnson Standard: 1) if the group is organized and armed, and 2) whether the
group amounts to a co-belligerent of al Qaeda by entering the fight against the United States and
its coalition partners alongside al Qaeda. By breaking the Johnson Standard down into these two
requirements, this analysis eliminates its repetitive nature. After the analysis, this paper will examine
whether the Johnson Standard is useful in allowing the United States to combat groups affiliated
with al Qaeda and whether other methods should be implemented to combat these threats.
introduction to al Qaeda in iraQ
Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) share the same religious beliefs and ideology. Both
groups are strict Sunni/Salafists.208 Following the belief system of al Qaeda, AQI seeks to create
civil unrest in Iraq and the Levant region to gain control of territory and garner support for their
cause.209 AQI believes that by inciting civil unrest, they can incite a civil war.210 Al Qaeda and AQI’s
share the ultimate goal of establishing a transnational Islamic state that is based in Sharia law.211
Early in AQI’s development, its members were primarily from Pakistan and Afghanistan.212 As
the group grew, it attracted more recruits from Syria and Iraq.213 By 2006, AQI’s members were
predominately Iraqi.214 Iraq’s population is majority Shia Muslim, with a minority Sunni.215 The
Sunni population feels discriminated against because of this dynamic.216 Since AQI is a Sunni group,
AQI has painted themselves as a defender of Sunnis against the Shia majority.
AQI was initially led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who was known as charismatic leader that
employed brutal methods to achieve his goals.217 Zarqawi was a close associate of Osama Bin Laden
and was tasked with spreading al Qaeda to Iraq. 218 Zarqawi used brutal and shocking methods, such
208 See Laub, supra note 20 (explaining AQI’s historical origins).
209 See id. (showing similarities between AQI and al Qaeda).
210 See Kirdar, supra note 25, at 4 (outlining AQI’s overarching goals).
211 See Laub, supra note 20 (demonstrating greater overlap between AQI and al Qaeda’s objectives).
212 See id. (demonstrating that AQI’s original members were from al Qaeda’s core group in Afghanistan and Pakistan).
213 See id. (explaining the evolution of AQI into a more regional group with closer ties to Syria and Iraq).
214 See Laub, supra note 20 (explaining the groups current ethnic and national makeup).
215 The World Factbook: Iraq, central intelligence agency (May 12, 2014), https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html (explaining the ethnic makeup of Iraq as a whole).
216 See Shias dominate Sunnis in the new Iraq, cBc news (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/shias-dominatesunnis-in-the-new-iraq-1.1269416 (showing the economic and social disparity between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq).
217 See Kirdar, supra note 25, at 2 (describing the history of AQI under Zarqawi).
218 See id. at 3 (explaining operational connection between the main al Qaeda leadership and Zarqawi).
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as suicide bombings and releasing videos of beheadings and public executions.219 These methods
created tension between Zarqawi and Osama Bin Laden.220 Bin Laden and AQSL worried that
Zarqawi’s methods would turn the public against AQI.221 Zarqawi led AQI until he was killed by a
U.S. airstrike in 2006.222
After Zarqawi’s death, Abu Ayyub al-Marsi (A.K.A. Abu Hamza al Muhajir) took over
leadership of the group.223 Al-Marsi had previously worked closely with Zarqawi and had strong ties
to al Qaeda.224 Al-Marsi rebranded the group as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Al-Marsi led ISIS
until it was taken over by the current leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.225 Baghdadi changed the groups
name to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to reflect the group’s expansion into Syria.226 Most
recently, ISIS gained control of territory in Fallujah in Iraq.227 However, as ISIS increasingly moved
into Syria, tensions arose between ISIS and al Nusra, an al Qaeda affiliate native to Syria. These
tensions led to infighting and eventually led AQSL to publicly denounce ISIS and disavow ISIS as an
al Qaeda affiliate.
As ISIS developed, its relationship with AQSL has wavered between periods of harmony
and directly disobeying AQSL. This tumultuous relationship has made it difficult to determine at
which points the AUMF would authorize the United States to use force against AQI or ISIS as
an associated force of al Qaeda. This question has only become more pressing as ISIS has made
significant gains in Iraq, particularly by holding Fallujah. By breaking down AQI’s development
into phases we can determine when AQI/ISIS fits the Johnson Standard, and therefore, could be
targeted under the AUMF as an associated forces of al Qaeda.
Phase 1: aQi’s creation and develoPment into an associated Force oF al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda in Iraq initially began in Jordan in the early 1990’s.228 From the beginning, the
group was led by Zarqawi. Previously, Zarqawi was arrested for drug possession in Jordan.229 He
remained in jail until 1988 and adopted radical religious beliefs while he was in prison.230 After his
release from prison, Zarqawi participated in the end of the Soviet-Afghan conflict.231 Although
219 See id. at 4 (demonstrating AQI’s tactics).
220 See id. (explaining that AQIQInal connection between the by the main al Qaeda branch).
221 See id. (demonstrating the beginning of a rift within al Qaeda).
222 See Kirdar, supra note 25, at 5 (providing history of AQI leadership).
223 See id.
224 See id. (showing increasing ties to al Qaeda under the leadership of Al-Masri).
225 See Laub, supra note 20 (explaining change of AQI leadership).
226 See id. (demonstrating that the change of leadership also came with change of goals and branding).
227 See Bill Roggio, Al Qaeda, tribal allies ‘control’ Fallujah, the long war Journal (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.
longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/al_qaeda_tribal_alli.php# (showing growth of ISIS since its change in
leadership).
228 See Kirdar, supra note 25, at 1.
229 See id. at 2.
230 See id.
231 See Lee Hudson Teslik, Profile: Aub Musab al-Zarqawi, council on Foreign relations (June 8, 2006), http://www.
cfr.org/iraq/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/p9866.
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Soviet forces were already withdrawing by the time Zarqawi joined, this experience exposed him
to al Qaeda and the Salafi religious doctrine.232 Zarqawi founded Bayal al Iman, a jihadist group, in
Jordan.233 Zarqawi was again arrested in Jordan in 1993.234 While Zarqawi was in jail, he became
increasingly religious and built up a following, which garnered the attention of Bin Laden.235
Zarqawi was released from prison in 1999 and left for Afghanistan.236 In Afghanistan, Zarqawi met
with Bin Laden and the two planned to expand al Qaeda.237 Bin Laden reportedly gave Zarqawi
$5,000 to set up his own training camp in Herat.238 By 2001, that camp had 2,000-3,000 recruits.239
Zarqawi changed the group’s name to al-Tawhid wal-Juhad, before later adopting the name al Qaeda
in Iraq.240 Zarqawi commanded volunteers in Herat until he fled to North Iraq in 2001.241 Once in
North Iraq, Zarqawi joined Ansar al-Islam (a Kurdish separatist movement), of which he led the
Arab contingent.242
Al Qaeda in Iraq first emerged in Iraq shortly after the U.S. invasion to oust Saddam
Hussein.243 Bin Laden saw the U.S. invasion of Iraq as an opportunity to directly fight the
United States, and he seized this opportunity by sending Zarqawi to set up an al Qaeda branch
in Iraq.244 The U.S. invasion brought instability into the country that created a power vacuum.245
The lawlessness that came with the invasion allowed AQI to profit from criminal activities and to
build public support.246 AQI successfully used guerrilla war tactics against U.S. coalition forces to
gain territory.247 Zarqawi and AQI initially flourished in Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003.248 Al
Qaeda helped to funnel Arab Islamists through Syria and into Iraq to increase Zarqawi’s recruits.249
Zarqawi also heavily recruited from the Sunni triangle (the area between Baghdad Ramadi, and
Tikrit).250 As Zarqawi’s network increased, he became the default conduit for smuggling for many
Islamic terrorist and Jihadist groups in the region.251
Zarqawi devised a four-part strategy to combat the U.S. and coalition forces.252 Zarqawi
232
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focused on completing this strategy in order to expand his network and take control of territory in
Iraq.253 Zarqawi’s strategy was: 1) to isolate American forces by targeting the United States’ coalition
partners to drive them out of the conflict, 2) to deter Iraqi cooperation with US forces, 3) to prevent
the rebuilding process through attacks and by attacking and preventing humanitarian efforts to
rebuild, and 4) to spark a civil war between Sunni and Shia Muslims to ensnare the United States
in a prolonged conflict.254 Most infamously, in May 2004, Zarqawi and his followers beheaded a
humanitarian aid worker and released a video of the beheading.255 Zarqawi also frequently attacked
Shia targets. AQI attacked Shia leader, Sayyid Muhamid in Najaf.256
Zarqawi first officially vowed allegiance to Osama Bin Laden as the leader of Al Qaeda in
October 2004.257 Shortly after pledging allegiance to Bin Laden, AQI began distributing leaflets
to the public demanding that the public either comply with AQI’s beliefs or face execution.258
After Zarqawi pledged allegiance to al Qaeda, the U.S. State Department immediately listed AQI
as a foreign terrorist organization.259 The United States also launched a psychological operation,
distributing leaflets decrying Zarqawi as a foreigner.260
As Zarqawi gained popularity, he increasingly used brutal tactics and attacked Shia religious
sites. Zarqawi pioneered the way that al Qaeda uses suicide bombings and roadside bombings.261
Zarqawi was the first to use multiple coordinated attacks on different targets to instill fear in the
public.262 Tensions between Zarqawi and other factions within the Iraqi insurgency developed.263
Many felt that Zarqawi was too brutal, or unfairly brutal towards Iraqi Shias.264 Simultaneously,
the controversy over the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison developed.265 This
scandal increased AQI’s popularity within Iraq and garnered more support for AQI over other
insurgencies.266 During this period, AQI was estimated to have 15,000 active members.267 Although
this period marked the peak of Zarqawi’s prominence, some more nationalistic insurgencies in Iraq
began to distance themselves from AQI due to Zarqawi’s brutality and religious agenda.268
Zarqawi also refined the way that al Qaeda uses the internet and media to disseminate
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Kirdar, supra note 25, at 4.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Laub, supra note 20.
260 Kirdar, supra note 25, at 8.
261 See Karen DeYoung & Walter Pincus, Al -Qaeda in Iraq May Not Be Threat Here, wash. Post, Mar. 18, 2007, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/17/AR2007031701373_pf.html (noting Zarqawi’s early
reliance on these tactics).
262 Kirdar, supra note 25, at 4, 8.
263 Id. at 4.
264 Id. at 8.5.
265 Id. at 7.
266 Id.
267 Kirdar, supra note 25, at 5.
268 Id. at 4.
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their message.269 Zarqawi began using chat rooms, video clips and gruesome videos to convey
his message.270 This marketing technique brought more international attention to AQI.271 Al
Qaeda learned from Zarqawi’s success with online media and adopted his strategies for their own
operations.272 Additionally, AQI’s strategies had discouraged foreign investment by popularizing
the idea of the Iraqi region as unstable and unsafe.273 Without foreign investment, Iraq remained
unstable, allowing AQI to develop and gain territory.274
analysis oF Phase 1:
During the first phase of AQI’s development, AQI likely met the Johnson Standard and
could be considered an associated force of al Qaeda. Of the five phases of AQI’s development,
the first phase most clearly fits into the Johnson Standard for an associated force of al Qaeda.
Therefore, AQI likely could have been targeted and its members could have been detained under
the AUMF during this phase. However, during phase 1, the United States was engaged in a war in
Iraq and therefore did not need to rely on the AUMF to target AQI inside Iraq. Congress passed
a separate authorization for the war in Iraq that allowed U.S. troops to attack and retaliate against
insurgents inside of Iraq.275 The United States could have used the AUMF to attack or detain AQI
forces operating outside of Iraq. For example, if the United States wanted to attack training camps
or bases that AQI had in Jordan, it could have done so under the AUMF, as ISIS is an associated
force of al Qaeda and therefore the United States can target its bases anywhere in the world. The
United States could have also detained members of AQI that were operating in other countries
under the AUMF. For example, if the United States captured an ISIS member in Jordan or Syria,
the United States could have detained that individual for being a member of an associated force of
al Qaeda.
In applying the Johnson Standard to phase 1, AQI was an armed and organized group that
amounted to a co-belligerent of al Qaeda by joining al Qaeda in its fight against the United States
and its coalition partners. First, AQI’s structure and actions make them an organized and armed
group. During phase 1, AQI had a well-defined organizational structure, with Zarqawi as the
leader. AQI organized criminal activities, orchestrated attacks, and released statement to disseminate
its message. AQI was organized enough to serve as a conduit for other insurgencies to smuggle
equipment, supplies, and funds to Iraq. AQI maintained training camps to prepare new recruits to
join. AQI’s organization allowed the group to pioneer the way that al Qaeda used the Internet and
media to decimate their message and gain support. With its organizational structure established,
AQI was also an armed group. AQI executed coordinated and deadly attacks. AQI carefully selected
targets that would garner them the most attention and produce the most brutal and shocking results.
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AQI was also officially listed by the United States as a terrorist organization. AQI was both an
organized and armed group, therefore meeting the first requirement of the Johnson Standard.
During phase 1, AQI also amounted to a co-belligerent of al Qaeda by joining al Qaeda in
the fight against the United States and its coalition partners. AQI was founded to be an extension
of al Qaeda and to allow al Qaeda to directly attack U.S. forces in Iraq. Zarqawi was taken in by
Bin Laden and specifically tasked with developing an al Qaeda affiliate that would spread al Qaeda’s
goals to Iraq. Bin Laden gave Zarqawi the funds and resources to do so. Zarqawi followed Bin
Laden’s orders to move the group from Jordan to Iraq to attack U.S. forces. AQI adopted al
Qaeda’s religious and political beliefs and brought al Qaeda’s ideology to Iraq. Further, Zarqawi
formally acknowledged Bin Laden’s leadership in 2004, this acknowledgement demonstrated
that AQI recognized that it was working under al Qaeda in executing al Qaeda’s agenda. This
acknowledgement shows that AQI was taking orders from AQSL and seemed to be operating under
the command structure of core al Qaeda (which closely resembled what the Heyns and Emmerson
Report require for showing co-belligerency).276 AQI also shared its strategies with al Qaeda on both
building an internet campaign and using coordinated suicide and roadside bombings. All of these
facts show that AQI was operating under the umbrella of al Qaeda by working to spread al Qaeda’s
agenda to Iraq. During phase 1, AQI met the standard of being joining the fight alongside al Qaeda
in the fight against the United States. AQI even potentially met the high standard of co-belligerency,
stated in the Heyns and Emmerson report, of having an integrated command structure during this
period. During phase 1 AQI had entered the fight along side al Qaeda against the United States and
its coalition partners and was active working to achieve al Qaeda’s goals.
AQI’s relationship with al Qaeda and its attacks on American forces at Bin Laden’s behest
during phase 1 satisfy the two requirements Johnson Standard. Phase 1 marks the most clear-cut
example of when AQI/ISIS was an associated force of al Qaeda under the Johnson Standard.
As the rest of this analysis will show, AQI worked more closely with al Qaeda during this phase
than during any other. During this phase, AQI functioned as a mouthpiece for al Qaeda and did
not show much autonomy from al Qaeda. Al Qaeda and AQI appeared to have a cooperative
relationship. Through later phases, the relationship between AQI/ISIS and al Qaeda becomes more
complicated and contentious, making it harder to determine if the two Johnson requirements are
met. The relationship between al Qaeda and AQI in phase 1 serves as a benchmark for showing
what type of relationship clearly meets the Johnson Standard. The United States could have used
the AUMF to target or detain AQI members, even if those members were located outside of Iraq
through phrase 1.
Phase 2: tensions arise Between aQi and al Qaeda
Despite AQI’s brutal tactics and high profile attacks, the group failed to maintain meaningful
gains inside Iraq, which eventually diminished the group’s prestige.277 Although AQI continued
276 See Heyns, supra note 103, at 17-18 (explaining that an armed actor must have an integrated command structure
with a belligerent to be a co-belligerent).
277 Kirdar, supra note 25, at 1.
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executing brutal attacks and releasing gruesome videos, these actions soon backfired and diminished
AQI’s popularity and hurt their credibility.278 The ideological motivations of Zarqawi and the
attacks on Shias were at odds with the nationalist insurgencies and turned public opinion away from
AQI.279 AQI’s insistence on dominating the insurgency movement led other Iraqi insurgent groups
to band together against AQI as well. AQI’s position as the most prominent insurgent group in Iraq
led other smaller and nationalist insurgencies to counter AQI’s dominance.280 This increased the
tensions between AQI and other insurgencies and further diminished AQI’s popularity.
As AQI began to lose popular support and the support of other insurgencies, al Qaeda
sought deeper involvement in the group.281 AQSL questioned Zarqawi’s brutal methods through
written correspondence.282 Zarqawi refused al Qaeda’s orders and AQI continued to use brutal
tactics and target Shias.283 Most significantly, AQI bombed the Gold Dome of a Shia shrine in
Samarra in February 2006.284 Zarqawi’s refusal to obey AQSL’s order led to severe tension between
AQI and al Qaeda.285 Despite mounting tension with al Qaeda and a loss of public support in Iraq,
Zarqawi continued using brutal tactics, which deepened the rift between al Qaeda and AQI.
After resisting further involvement from al Qaeda, Zarqawi tried to rebuild AQI’s public
image on his own by collaborating with other terrorist organizations in the region.286 AQI joined
five other Iraqi terrorist organizations to create the Mujahideen Shura Council.287 The purpose of
the Council was for the groups to coordinate to achieve their common goals and to ease tension
between rival insurgencies.288 However, instead of including Zarqawi, the Council excluded him
from their meetings and decisions.289 Zarqawi’s exclusion from the counsel diminished his prestige
within Iraq.290 Zarqawi and AQI became further ostracized in Iraq after joining the counsel.
In addition to a developing rift with al Qaeda, AQI’s ranks were severely depleted by U.S.
special operations and the Sunni Awakening movement.291 Most significantly, in June 2006, the
United States launched an airstrike that killed Zarqawi.292 Zarqawi’s death marked a huge victory for
the United States and Iraqi intelligence.293 In the week following Zarqawi’s death, the United States
conducted 452 raids in Iraq, killing 104 Iraqi insurgents and capturing 759 anti-Iraqi elements.294 In
278 Id. at 9.
279 Id. at 8.
280 Id. at 9 (explaining that many fighters for other insurgencies turned to supporting Iraqi Security forces or
nationalist insurgencies against AQI).
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the aftermath of these raids, Iraqi security officials declared it the “beginning of the end” of AQI.295
AQI’s ranks were significantly depleted and AQI was forced to reorganize.296
After Zarqawi’s death, both U.S. and Iraqi security experts expected AQI to crumble,
however the group transitioned to new leadership.297 Abu Ayyub al-Marsi (A.K.A Abu Hamza al
Muhajir) took over leadership of AQI.298 Marsi previously served as AQI’s Emir.299 Marsi was born
in Egypt and began his militant career leading the Egyptian Islamic Jihad under Zawahiri.300 Marsi
was a member of Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad and had known Zawahiri since 1982.301 Marsi
successfully increased ISI’s sectarian violence and maintained the pace of operations of the AQI had
under Zarqawi.302 AQI bombed a Shia stronghold in Sadr City in Baghdad in November 2006.303
This attack demonstrated that AQI could maintain the same level of brutal violence that Zarqawi
was known for.304 In the 2006-2007 transition from Zarqawi to Marsi, terrorist attacks or violence
only fell by 6%, dropping from 6,631 attacks to 6,201.305
As AQI continued to use brutal violence, Sunnis, including al Qaeda, turned against AQI,
forcing AQI to rebrand itself. Tensions between AQI and Al Qaeda only deepened after Marsi
took over leadership.306 Initially only Shias retaliated against AQI’s attacks.307 However, in early
2006, other Sunni insurgencies launched covert missions against AQI.308 These attacks became
public in September.309 By the spring of 2009, 100,000 Sunni tribesman and former insurgents
were on the United States’ payroll fighting against AQI.310 In response to attacks from within the
Sunni community, Marsi changed AQI’s name to Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in October 2006.311 The
ISI name was designed to attract Sunni recruits and to end infighting with Sunni insurgencies.312
Changing the group’s name to ISI reflected the group’s new focus on building its reputation inside
Iraq.
Despite ISI’s effort to rebrand, a surge of U.S. troops in Iraq combined with increasing
tensions between ISI and al Qaeda led ISI to essentially dissolve by the end of 2007. In the
www.csmonitor.com/2006/0616/p01s04-woiq.html (describing the rapid escalation of U.S. attacks on AQI surrounding
Zarqawi terror).
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beginning of 2007, the United States deployed an additional 20,000 troops to Iraq.313 These
additional troops worked with the Sunni tribesman on the United States’ payroll to undermine ISI’s
presence in Iraq.314 By 2008, 2,400 members of ISI had been killed and 8,800 had been captured.315
The terrorism incidents in Iraq sunk to only 3,256 in 2008. The number of foreign fighters traveling
to Iraq to join the jihad withered from 120 per month to only 45 per month. By 2009, only five or
six fighters would enter Iraq to join the insurgency each month.316 Al Qaeda dramatically reduced
their statements about Iraq and ISI, indicating their self-admitted defeat.317 The U.S. troop increase
succeeded in significantly diminishing ISI presence in Iraq. Finally in 2007, Zarqawi, who was
second-in-command of al Qaeda at the time, announced that there was no longer an al Qaeda
affiliate in Iraq.318 He announced that the al Qaeda cell in Iraq has been dissolved into other groups
and no longer existed as an independent organization.319
By 2008, ISI was on the verge of collapse.320 ISI was no longer able to launch attacks with
the same frequency or to hold territory.321 On April 18, 2010, Marsi, was killed in a joint American
and Iraqi operation.322 The U.S. and Iraqi forces followed-up with a series of raids over a 90-day
period.323 The United States reported either detaining or killing 34 of the top 42 ISI leaders.324
United States and Iraqi action cut ISI off from AQSL and forced ISI to reorganize.325 The death of
Marsi was a crushing blow to ISI. CIA director Michael Hayden declared that ISI was no longer a
threat to the United States.326 Abu Suleiman al-Nasser took over leadership of ISI.327 In an attempt
to rebuild its reputation, ISI, under Nasser, first planned high profile attacks, such as bombing the
World Cup in South Africa.328 However, ISI was unable to complete these attacks, which damaged
ISI’s credibility.329 ISI completed smaller attacks, such as their attack on a Roman Catholic Church
in Baghdad and coordinating fifteen car bombings across Baghdad.330 These attacks were successful,
but it was not enough to rebuild ISI’s severely damaged reputation.
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analysis oF Phase 2:
Phase 2 marks ISI stepping away from its association with al Qaeda. Although ISI began
this phase as solidly fitting into the Johnson Standard of an associated force, Zarqawi’s death,
distance from al Qaeda, and the successful surge of U.S. troops, all cut ISI off from al Qaeda and
significantly diminished their presence in the region. First, while AQI began phase 2 as an organized
armed group, the group’s organization and capacity to launch attacks quickly diminished. Although
ISI maintained a basic organizational structure, the group was not as organized as it was in phase
1. Second, ISI shifted away from al Qaeda and was not as cooperative or as supported by al Qaeda
during phase 2. Al Qaeda stopped acknowledging ISI by 2007, indicating that the groups were
no longer affiliated. By the end of phase 2, ISI likely did not meet the Johnson Standard for an
associated force of al Qaeda.
In examining the two requirements of the Johnson Standard, ISI lost its organizational
structure and was not as successful at launching attacks during phase 2. ISI stepped away from
meeting the first requirement, that the group be armed and organized, in phase 2. ISI was forced
to reorganize after the death of Zarqawi, who had founded the group and was responsible for
the group’s success thus far. Although ISI navigated the transition to Marsi’s leadership, the
group struggled to transition to Nasser’s leadership. Additional, the U.S. raids and airstrikes in
Iraq significantly diminished ISI’s ranks in Iraq. As ISI’s structure became more disorganized, ISI
was unable to launch high profile attacks. Unlike Zarqawi and Marsi, al-Nasser had not worked
with Bin Laden or Zawahiri. Al-Nasser did not have the same exposure to al Qaeda that ISI’s
previous leaders had. Al-Nasser was unable to hold together ISI’s leadership and structure while
under heavy attack by U.S. troops. ISI was cut off from communications with AQSL, leaving
ISI to try to combat the U.S. troops without outside help. While ISI remained ambitious, their
lack of organization prevented them from successfully launching high profile attacks. ISI still
completed smaller attacks inside Iraq. Eventually, as the U.S. troops prevailed, ISI’s leadership
structure crumbled, leading ISI’s members to dissolve into other Sunni insurgencies. Zawahiri’s
acknowledgement that there was no longer an al Qaeda affiliate in Iraq shows that the group’s
organizational structure had collapsed. During phase 2, ISI stepped further away from meeting the
first requirement of the Johnson Standard. By the end of phase 2, ISI would likely not meet the
Johnson Standard as their organization had fallen apart and they were no longer launching attacks.
ISI likely did not meet the second requirement of the Johnson Standard because ISI was
no longer acknowledged by al Qaeda by the end of phase 2. The Johnson Standard requires that
the group entered right alongside al Qaeda. While AQI began phase 2 with many of the same
broad goals as al Qaeda, AQI began rejecting al Qaeda and AQSL’s authority in phase 2. The
public turned against Zarqawi because of his brutality. Maintaining public support has always
been a part of al Qaeda’s grand strategy and Zarqawi’s decision to forgo public image was in direct
conflict with al Qaeda’s strategy. Marsi continued what Zarqawi started by resisting al Qaeda’s
authority and disobeying al Qaeda’s orders. As Marsi shifted the group to a more nationalistic
focus, ISI and al Qaeda were no longer acting with one mind, as they were in phase 1. This
trend continued as ISI transitioned to Marsi and Nasser’s leadership. As ISI continued to act
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more autonomously and separated from al Qaeda, Zawahiri stated that there was no al Qaeda
affiliate in Iraq. This demonstrated to the public just how separate the two groups had become.
The Johnson requirement of joining the fight alongside al Qaeda cannot be met once Zawahiri
stopped acknowledging ISI as an al Qaeda affiliate. Without acknowledgement from al Qaeda, it is
impossible for ISI be to a co-belligerent or to join the fight along side al Qaeda. Although both ISI
and al Qaeda still shared an ideology and aggression towards the United States, ISI and al Qaeda
were not as closely linked or cooperative as they were in phase one. As Jeh Johnson and Judge Bates
expressed, sharing an ideology with al Qaeda is not enough to amount to a co-belligerent.331 The
beginning of phase 2 represents a gray area in the Johnson Standard where it is unclear whether ISI
amounts to a co-belligerent of al Qaeda. However, by the end of phase 2, it is clear that ISI cannot
be considered a co-belligerent of al Qaeda because al Qaeda no longer acknowledged ISI as an
affiliate. By the end of phase 2 ISI no longer met the standard for being an associated force of al
Qaeda.
By the conclusion of phase 2, the United States could not use the AUMF to target ISI
outside of Iraq. The beginning of phase 2 marks a turning point where ISI began to move away
from being an associated force of al Qaeda. It’s not exactly clear when ISI crosses this line, but
ISI is clearly no longer an associated force when Zawahiri states that there is no al Qaeda affiliate
in Iraq. ISI’s transition out of being an associated force of al Qaeda illustrates a gray area in the
Johnson Standard. It is not clear when ISI crosses to line from associated force to independent
belligerent. The Johnson Standard provides no specific guidance on how to resolve this. In the early
stages of phase 2, the President would be left to determine whether or not ISI still amounted to an
associated force. In phase 2, the United States was still engaged in a war in Iraq and had a separate
authorization to use force in that conflict. Under this separate authorization, the United States
would be able to target ISI members or bases that were inside Iraq. However, since ISI was not an
associated force of al Qaeda by the end of phase 2, the United States could not use the AUMF to
target ISI’s members or bases located outside of Iraq. During phase 1, the United States had the
authority to target or detain ISI members outside of Iraq because ISI was an associated forces of al
Qaeda. The United States lost that ability in phase 2 when ISI became more disorganized and was
no longer recognized by al Qaeda as their Iraqi affiliate. ISI was significantly weakened by the end
of phase 2 and was not a threat to the United States so the United States may not felt threatened
enough to target ISI member or bases in other countries. However, if the United States wanted
to use force against ISI targets, the United States would have obtained a separate Congressional
authorization.
Phase 3: isi resurgence in iraQ
Although ISI initially had trouble recovering from a series of US and Iraqi attacks, by 2012,

331 See Johnson, supra note 8 (explaining that an associated force is not simply any terrorist organization that embraces
al Qaeda ideology); see also Hamlily, supra note 6 (holding sharing an ideology with al Qaeda is not enough to amount to
an associated forces or co-belligerent).
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the group had regained its strength and was active again.332 Baghdadi took over leadership of the
group and changed the group’s name to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).333 The group is
alternatively known as the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant (ISIL). Baghdadi changed the group’s
name to reflect his ambitions to expand the group into Syria.334 The violence inside of Syria had
helped ISIS to rebuild. The violence in Syria created chaos along the border, which allows ISIS to
operate more freely.335 The U.S. troops left Iraq in 2011.336 Since U.S. troops were gone and the
Iraqi troops were distracted by the developing chaos in Syria, ISIS rebuilt its ranks and resurged
inside Iraq, with the ambition of expanding into Syria.
Inside Iraq, ISIS flourished by portraying themselves as the defenders of the Sunnis against
the Makali Government.337 Sunnis increasingly felt marginalized by the Malaki Government and
public opinion turned against Malaki, which bolstered support for Sunni insurgencies, like ISIS, that
were against Malaki.338 Sunnis began protesting against Malaki in the Anbar province in December
2012.339 This civil unrest allowed ISIS to portray themselves as defenders of the Iraqi Sunnis.340
ISIS again relied on car bombings and suicide bombing attacks, reminiscent of Zarqawi, to rebuild
their reputation.341 ISIS used coordinated attacks on Shia markets, cafes, and mosques. 20122013, marked the beginning of one of ISIS’s bloodiest periods. ISIS coordinated attacks across
several cities in Iraq that targeted Shias and killed civilians.342 For a dozen days straight in 2012,
ISIS launched coordinated attacks that each killed at least 25 Iraqis per attack.343 Four of those
attacks left over one hundred Iraqis dead.344 In April 2013, Iraqi security forces raided a protest
camp in a-Hawija, which provoked Sunnis and led to even more violence and Sunni militancy
against Malaki.345 In July 2013, Baghdadi and ISIS broke into Abu Ghraib Prison.346 ISIS used
suicide bombers and 50 militia members to break into the prison.347 They freed 1,000 prisoners.348
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Of those 1,000, about half were affiliated with al Qaeda.349 The attack on Abu Ghraib not only
replenished ISIS ranks, but it significantly bolstered their reputation inside Iraq.
After the Abu Ghraib break in, ISIS continued to launch brutal attacks in Iraq and forced
the United States to reevaluate the threat level of ISIS. In summer 2013, ISIS launched a series of
attacks in Baghdad over a 90-day period.350 This series of attacks culminated when ISIS attacked
families celebrating Eid Al Fitr in Baghdad.351 In December 2013, ISIS reportedly killed more
than 700 civilians in Baghdad.352 ISIS alone reportedly killed 7,818 Iraqis throughout 2013, making
it Iraq’s bloodiest year since 2001.353 ISIS’s resurgence between 2012-2013 led US officials to
reevaluate the threat level of ISIS. Matt Olson, the head of the National Counterterrorism Center
stated that ISIS, at this point, was stronger than any previous point in its history.354 After ISIS’s
resurgence in Iraq, the United States offered ten million dollars for information that would help
authorities to capture or kill Baghdadi.355 The United States stated that it is prepared and willing to
work with the Iraqi government to help combat ISIS.356
analysis oF Phase 3:
During Phase 3, ISI resurged as ISIS and became closer to meeting the Johnson Standard.
ISIS rebuilt its organizational structure and successfully launched large-scale attacks. The group also
rebuilt its relationship with al Qaeda, although not to the level that the Johnson Standard requires.
Since ISIS was more organized and armed during this phase, ISIS met the first requirement of the
Johnson Standard. ISIS comes closer to meeting the second requirement of Johnson Standard than
the group was in phase 2, but ISIS still did not have as strong of a relationship with al Qaeda as
AQI had in phase 1. Further, ISIS was not attacking U.S. or coalition troops once the troops had
left Iraq. While ISIS shared al Qaeda’s aggression towards the United States, ISIS was focused on
gaining territory in Iraq and Syria as opposed to attacking the United States. During phase 3, ISIS
came closer to being an associated force of al Qaeda than in phase 2, however, ISIS was not fighting
U.S. or coalition forces and therefore cannot meet the Johnson Standard.
In analyzing the first requirement of the Johnson Standard during phase 3, ISIS became
an organized and armed group. After ISI was decimated by US forces in phase 2, ISIS emerged in
2012 as an organized terrorist group that completed large scale attacks. Baghdadi established new
leadership and set up an organizational structure for ISIS. ISIS rebuilt its structure through new
recruits. Baghdadi’s break in to Abu Ghraib prison helped to fill ISIS’s ranks with members that
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www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-11/u-s-condemns-iraq-attacks-that-killed-dozens-during-holiday.html.
351 Id.
352 US Assisting in Iraq in Fight Against al Qaeda 2 years After Troops Withdrew, aBc news (Jan. 23, 2014), http://
abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/01/us-assisting-iraq-in-fight-against-al-qaeda-2-years-after-troops-withdraw.
353 Id.
354 See Byman, supra note 320.
355 Jen Psaki, Spokesperson, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Condemns Terrorist Attack in Iraq and Pledges to Help
Combat al Qaeda, deP’t oF state (Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/08/213032.htm.
356 Id.

160

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 5, No. 1

were trained by al Qaeda. Baghdadi again relied on the coordinated suicide bombing attacks that
were reminiscent of the way Zarqawi’s leadership style. ISIS’s structure allowed the group to hold
territory and to expand into Syria. All of these facts demonstrate that ISIS once again had a strong
organizational structure that allowed ISIS to plan and execute sophisticated attacks inside Iraq.
Although ISIS met the first requirement of the Johnson Standard during phase 3, it is not
as clear whether the group met the second requirement of joining the fight against the United
States alongside al Qaeda. When ISIS reemerged, the group still shared al Qaeda’s core beliefs
and ideology. However, this fact alone is not enough to make ISIS an associated force of al
Qaeda. During Phase 3, ISIS did not resist al Qaeda’s orders the way that ISI had during phase 2;
however, the group was not particularly cooperative with al Qaeda either. Baghdadi did not have
a relationship with Zawahiri previously and did not have the same connection to al Qaeda that
Zarqawi and Marsi had. However, even though ISIS did not explicitly pledge its allegiance to al
Qaeda, under Jihadist doctrine, ISIS must be loyal to al Qaeda since ISIS was born from ISI who
had pledged allegiance to al Qaeda.357 ISIS was under al Qaeda’s banner by default.358 ISIS did
cooperate with al Nusra, who had explicitly pledged allegiance to al Qaeda. While ISIS did have
a more cooperative relationship with al Qaeda in phase 3, the relationship was still not as close as
it was in phase 1. However, ISIS still fell under the al Qaeda banner and was cooperating with al
Qaeda and al Qaeda’s affiliate, al Nusra during this phase.
During phase 3, ISIS did not fight against the United States or its coalition partners, meaning
that ISIS cannot me meet the second requirement of the Johnson Standard. Although ISIS was
more cooperative with al Qaeda during phase 3, the Johnson Standard requires that the group has
joined al Qaeda’s fight against the United States and its coalition partners. While ISIS may have
joined along side al Qaeda during phase 3, the group did not join al Qaeda’s fight against the United
States. ISIS was focused on launching attacks against Malaki in Iraq and against Assad in Syria.
The group was focused on gaining territory in these two states. ISIS was not fighting U.S. troops
or attempting to launch an attack against U.S. resources in the region or the U.S. homeland. Had
ISIS launched an attack on a U.S. base or tried, even unsuccessfully, to launch an attack on the U.S.
homeland, ISIS likely would have met the Johnson Standard and therefore could have been targeted
by the AUMF. However, ISIS did not take any action against the United States and therefore cannot
meet the second requirement of the Johnson Standard. Since ISIS does not meet the second
prong of the Johnson Standard, the United States could not use the AUMF to target ISIS’s bases or
members either in Iraq or Syria.
Although the United States could not have targeted ISIS under the AUMF, the United States
still could have provided resources and aid to Malaki to help Iraq fight ISIS from inside Iraq. The
United States could have provided resources or aid to both Iraq and Syria to help combat ISIS.
Although, politically speaking, the United States would not have given aid to the Assad regime, the
United States could have legally done so to combat ISIS’s presence in Syria. Since the United States
357 Suhaib Angarini, The Evolution of ISIS, al monitor (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/
security/ 2013/11/syria-islamic-state-iraq-sham-growth.html# (explaining that the “loyalty to al Qaeda may be the
common denominator between ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra”).
358 See id. (describing that ISIS is loyal to al Qaeda because it is a branch of the main organization).
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was politically constrained and could not provide aid to fight ISIS in Syria, the United States’ only
option was to give aid to Malaki to fight ISIS in Iraq. In January 2014, the U.S. Secretary of State,
John Kerry, stated that the United States would help Iraq in any way possible to fight ISIS and other
jihadist insurgencies in Iraq.359 Secretary Kerry further stated that although the United States would
provide military aid, the United States would not put troops back in Iraq.360 Although the United
States cannot target ISIS under the AUMF, the United States can still help to combat ISIS in Iraq by
providing military aid to Malaki.
Phase 4: isis gains Power and seParates From al Qaeda’s authority
While ISIS maintained territory in Iraq, ISIS also expanded into Syria and worked with
already established insurgencies in Syria. The general population of Syria is religiously conservative,
but open to religious coexistence.361 However, as more Sunni Jihadists have joined the rebellion
against Assad, a Shia, ISIS expanded operations into the northern and eastern provinces of Syria.362
ISIS initially took administrative control of border towns by providing services to the community
but then imposed strict Sharia law.363 ISIS signed a truce with the Free Syrian Army in late 2013.364
The Free Syrian Army is one of the main sectarian groups that is fighting against Assad.365 In
signing the truce, the Free Syrian Army acknowledged ISIS’s efficacy in establishing a presence in
Syria and combatting Assad’s control.366
After signing the truce with the Free Syrian Army, ISIS announced a merger with Jahat al
Nusra. Al Nusra is an al Qaeda affiliated insurgency that is native to Syria.367 ISIS has cooperated
with al Nusra since early 2013, but Baghdadi officially announced the merger later in the year.368 Al
Nusra was one of the most effective rebel group inside Syria.369 When Baghdadi first announced
the merger, many non-Syrian al Nusra fighters left to join ISIS.370 One al Nusra fighter estimated
that 70% of al Nusra’s fighters in the Ldib province defected to join ISIS.371 Reportedly, in Syria’s
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eastern regions even a higher percentage of al Nusra’s fighters left to join ISIS.372 Those defections
led to confusion as to the organizational structure and who was in command.373 After the merger
announcement, the leader of al Nusra, Abu Mohammad al- Joulani issued an audio recording saying
that the merger was invalid because he had not been consulted.374 He demanded that al Nusra
fighters remain with al Nusra and not join ISIS.375 Despite Joulani’s announcement Baghdadi still
traveled with ISIS fighters to Aleppo to broaden ISIS’s Syrian operations.376
Baghdadi continued to advance into Syria, which angered al Nusra and created infighting
between the groups, leading Zawahiri to try to resolve the dispute. In June 2013, Zawahiri, who
had become the leader of al Qaeda in 2011, announced that the merger between ISIS and al Nusra
was invalid.377 Zawahiri commanded Baghdadi to only pursue operations in Iraq and to leave Syrian
operations to al Nusra. Zawahiri also sent an annulment letter to both groups.378 Zawahiri chastised
both groups for fighting publicly and for focusing on fighting each other rather than fighting
Assad.379 Zawahiri’s announcement instructed both groups to return to their respective countries
and focus on operations there.
Baghdadi immediately rejected Zawahiri’s announcement and continued operations in Syria.
Baghdadi refused Zawahiri’s order to return to Iraq in a public statement made on June 14, 2013.380
In the statement, Baghdadi questioned Zawahiri’s authority as the leader of al Qaeda.381 Baghdadi
continued to launch attacks in Syria to undermine the Assad regime.382 While ISIS and al Nusra
fought along side each other in attacking Assad, the infighting between the two groups steadily
increased.383 After Zawahiri’s announcement, both groups engaged in turf battles to determine who
controls what territory.384
As the infighting between ISIS and al Nusra increased, both groups called on al Qaeda to
mediate the conflict.385 This mediation was ultimately unsuccessful and Baghdadi rejected Zawahiri’s
authority.386 Both Joulani and Baghdadi sent separate letters to Zawahiri to ask him to mediate.387
Zawahiri called on both groups to cooperate and support each other with funds, weapons, and
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fighters.388 Zawahiri appointed a local al Qaeda commander to oversee cooperation between ISIS
and al Nusra.389 Shortly after the mediation began, Baghdidi released an audio recording stating
“I have to choose between the rule of God and the rule of al-Zawahiri and I choose the rule of
god.”390 Baghdadi’s statement boldly demonstrated Baghdadi’s defiance.391 Baghdadi implied that
ISIS would not follow al Qaeda’s agenda or respect their authority. This led to a sharp increase in
the infighting between ISIS and other insurgent groups in January 2014.392 Al Nusra critiqued ISIS
for focusing too much on establishing an Islamic state rather than focusing on the fight against
Assad.393 As infighting increased, al Nusra received more funding and support than ISIS.394
In January 2014, ISIS took total control of Fallujah and areas in Ramadi.395 Although ISIS
had been fighting for Fallujah for several months, they were able to take total control on January 1,
2014.396 ISIS fought Iraqi troops and police forces that remained in Fallujah and Ramdi.397 On New
Year’s Eve, Malaki pulled his troops out of both cities.398 With the military gone, ISIS took over
Fallujah and Ramdi. ISIS used snipers, rocket propelled grenades, and heavy street-fighting to gain
control.399 At least nineteen civilians were killed during the fighting. Iraqi forces reported that sixty
insurgents were killed.400 After taking control of Fallujah, Baghdadi released a statement saying “you
will see the mujahdeen at the head of your country…our war with you has only now started.”401
This statement was aimed at the United States, indicating that ISIS planed to over through Malaki
government that the United States established in Iraq.402 ISIS declared Fallujah Islamic emirate
and instituted sharia law.403 ISIS worked with other insurgencies to set up an administration to
keep public services running.404 After ISIS held Fallujah for several weeks, Malaki and the Iraqi
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400 See also Yasir Ghazi & Tim Arango, Qaeda-Linked militants in Iraq secure nearly full control of Fallujah, n.y. times, Jan.
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164

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 5, No. 1

government renewed their efforts to drive ISIS out of Fallujah.405 On January 22, 2013, Malaki
spoke to the public stating that it was time to clear ISIS out of Fallujah.406 Iraqi helicopters
bombarded the eastern and northern districts of Fallujah later that day.407 UN officials reported that
tens of thousands of civilians have fled the city in anticipation of a military strike.408 Makali did not
set a deadline or a timeline for military action.409 As of May 18, 2014, ISIS still controlled Fallujah,
despite Malaki’s efforts to regain control.410
In addition to holding Fallujah, ISIS retook Raqqa in Syria in mid-January.411 At the time,
ISIS was estimated to have 7,000 fighters in Northern Syria.412 To take Raqqa, ISIS forced out a
coalition of rebel groups.413 After several days of clashes, al Nusra joined the resistance against
ISIS. These clashes began in Western Aleppo and spread into Idilb, Raqqa, and Seir Ezzor.414 ISIS
succeeded in cutting off supply lines for other insurgency groups, including al Nusra. Syrian civilians
living in rebel-held towns protested against ISIS as ISIS clashed with other insurgencies.415 These
protests created an image problem for ISIS, who wanted to be the dominant insurgency in the
region while winning the support of the Syrian people. ISIS is allegedly holding hundred of rivals,
rebels, activists, and journalists captive.416 This has further damaged ISIS’s public image and turned
the Syrian public against them.
As ISIS continued fighting with al Nusra, ISIS further distanced themselves from al Qaeda.
The al Qaeda operative appointed to mediate between al Nusra and ISIS publicly chastised Baghdadi
and blamed him for the infighting between the two groups.417 He blamed Baghdadi for not
respecting the territory of al Nusra and for provoking more infighting between the two groups.418
Despite the reprimand from al Qaeda, Baghdadi has not slowed down his efforts in Syria and the
infighting in Syria continued.419 ISIS launched a double suicide bombing attack in Aleppo that killed
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2014) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-battle-for-fallujah-fighting-returns-to-iraqi-city-asalqaidalinked-rebels-gain-stronghold-9392741.html (stating that ISIS had gained momentum and strength as an entity).
411 ISIL recaptures Raqqa from Syria’s rebels, al Jazeera (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
middleeast/2014/01/isil-recaptures-raqqa-from-syrias-rebels-2014114201917453586.html.
412 See Freeman, supra note 346.
413 See ISIL recaptures Raqqa from Syria’s rebels, supra note 411.
414 Hassan Hassan, Breaking Syria’s reign of terror, Foreign Policy, (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2014/01/09/breaking_the_reign_of_terror_syria_al_qaeda.
415 See id. (commenting on the different strategies of the jihad group).
416 See ISIL recaptures Raqqa from Syria’s rebels, supra note 411.
417 See Joscelyn, supra note 34 (highlighting the response of the infighting between ISIS and other jihad groups).
418 See id. (describing Baghdadi’s actions as altruistic).
419 See Al-Qaeda fighters kill Syrian rebel leaders, al Jazeera (Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
middleeast/2014/02/al-qaeda-fighters-kill-syrian-rebel-leader-2014229511898140.html (criticizing Baghdadi’s most
recent attacks).
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twenty-six individuals.420 These attacks indicate that ISIS disregarded al Qaeda’s order and will keep
fighting in Syria.
analysis oF Phase 4:
During phase 4, ISIS stepped further away from its association with al Qaeda. While ISIS
still met the first requirement of the Johnson Standard, by being an armed and organized group,
ISIS moved even further away from meeting the second requirement. By the end of phase 4,
ISIS no longer had a cooperative relationship with al Qaeda and was not attacking US or coalition
forces in Iraq. As ISIS became more powerful and held territory and procure its own resources
and fighters, ISIS no longer needed to rely on al Qaeda for help. ISIS began to disobey al Qaeda’s
orders and act more autonomously. By the end of phase 4, ISIS was operating as an autonomous
insurgency and no longer met the Johnson Standard for being an associated force of al Qaeda. The
United States could not target ISIS, either in Iraq or Syria, under the AUMF. If the United States
wanted to combat ISIS, the United States would need a separate Congressional authorization or have
to rely on providing aid to the host states so that those states could combat ISIS.
In phase 4, ISIS was still an organized and armed group and therefore still met the first
requirement of the Johnson Standard. ISIS had a strong leadership structure, maintained territory
that it previously held, expanded into new territory, and even set up an administration inside
Fallujah. ISIS successfully launched large-scale attacks inside Iraq and Syria, and it still met the first
requirement of the Johnson Standard during Phase 4.
In phase 4, ISIS was no longer fighting alongside al Qaeda and was not fighting against the
U.S. or coalition forces. ISIS did not meet the second requirement of the Johnson Standard and
therefore could not be targeted under the AUMF. During phase 4, Baghdadi ignored orders from
AQSL to returned to Iraq announced that ISIS no longer acknowledged Zawahiri’s authority. This
statement clearly demonstrated that ISIS did not consider itself under the command of al Qaeda.
ISIS’s decision to announce a merger without permission from al Nusra’s leadership or AQSL
further indicated that ISIS desired to be autonomous. Although ISIS initially looked to al Qaeda to
mediate the conflict with al Nusra, ISIS did not respond to the mediator’s orders to return to Iraq.
ISIS’s open fighting with al Nusra indicates that ISIS did not see al Nusra as an ally and instead
fought with them for dominance in the region. Similarly to phase 3, ISIS was also still not fighting
against US troops or its coalition partners. As ISIS grew and no longer needed al Qaeda’s help, ISIS
became more independent and acted without al Qaeda’s approval. ISIS’s rejection of al Qaeda’s
authority demonstrates that, during phase 4, ISIS was not fighting along side al Qaeda.
Phase 4 marks the beginning of ISIS’s development into its own autonomous insurgency.
ISIS. During phase 4, ISIS would not be able to be targeted under the AUMF. The United States
could not use the AUMF’s authority to target any of their operations, either in Iraq or Syria. The
United States could also not use the AUMF’s authority o detain members of ISIS in Guantanamo.
If the United States wanted to combat ISIS, the United States would need a separate Congressional
authorization to use force against ISIS. The United States could still continue providing aid to
420 See also id. (highlighting the mass casualties).
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Malaki to help the Iraqi government combat ISIS.
Phase 5: isis’s disavowal From al Qaeda
In early February 2014, ISIS tensions with al Qaeda came to a head and al Qaeda disavowed
ISIS as an affiliate of al Qaeda.421 On February 3, 2014, Zawahiri released a statement explaining
that since Baghdadi refused orders from Zawahiri and al Qaeda, ISIS was cut off from al Qaeda.422
Zawahiri announced that al Qaeda has “no connection” to ISIS and was “not responsible for ISIS’s
actions.”423 Zawahiri stated that “the branches of al Qaeda are the ones that the General Command
of al Qaeda announces and recognized” and that ISIS was no longer recognized by al Qaeda.424
Zawahiri explained, that al Qaeda’s short-term goals are to remove the American presence from the
region and establish an Islamic Emirate in Iraq.425 Zawahiri stated that the best weapon to achieve
this was the popular support from Iraqi Muslims and that the “scenes of slaughter” of captives and
civilians were only turning the public against ISIS and undermining al Qaeda’s goals.426 Al Qaeda
has never formally disavowed an affiliate before.427 This public demonstration shows how far
tensions had developed between al Qaeda and ISIS. This disavowal solidified pre-existing tensions
between ISIS and al Qaeda.
As al Qaeda separated from ISIS, al Qaeda cooperated more with Syrian insurgents.428 Al
Nusra is now the only al Qaeda affiliate operating in Syria.429 Previously, al Nusra was seen as an
associated force of ISIS, making them two steps removed from al Qaeda.430 Now, al Nusra has
become the frontrunner in the Syrian insurgency.431 Al Nusra has increased separation from ISIS
since its disavowal.432 This shows al Nusra’s intentions to stay connected to al Qaeda. Al Nusra has
aligned with more moderate insurgencies in Syria to maintain public support.433 Al Nusra’s actions
have brought beneficial press and more support for al Qaeda by cooperating with more secular
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al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/isis-qaeda-zawahri-baghdadi-jihadist-syria-iraq.html#.
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groups and not using the brutal tactics used by Baghdadi.434
Even after being disavowed from al Qaeda, ISIS has been successful in Iraq as an
independent jihadist insurgency.435 ISIS is still the largest and most violent Sunni Jihadist group in
Northern Iraq and Syria.436 ISIS holds the most territory and successfully uses proto-state building
techniques to build strongholds.437 ISIS still has vast financial resources from criminal conduct in
Mosul and Northern Iraq.438 On February 5, 2014, only two days after being disowned by al Qaeda,
ISIS seized villages in Saladudin.439 ISIS used this attack to show their dominance in the region and
send the message that ISIS will not be discouraged by al Qaeda.440 Baghdadi has begun referring to
himself as Emir al-Mu’mineed, displaying his intentions to become a regional leader.441 Baghdadi
claimed that he is a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed’s family and therefore is the rightful
Caliph.442
As of May 2, 2014, ISIS still holds territory both in Iraq and Syria.443 In Iraq, ISIS has held
onto Fallujah and Ramdi.444 ISIS has successfully fought against the Iraqi government to maintain
its territory. In response to the Iraqi government’s efforts to force ISIS out of Fallujah, ISIS has
released gruesome videos of ISIS members killing government forces.445 One video, released in
March 2014, shows an ISIS fighter moving down a row of kneeling Iraqi soldiers and executing
each soldier with a pistol.446 ISIS has also released a video of ISIS members burning the bodies of
Iraqi soldiers and dragging the corpses behind a truck.447 Iraqi army units have reportedly carried
out extrajudicial killings of ISIS fighters in Fallujah.448 In March, ISIS closed the gates of the
Euphrates River, south of Fallujah, to flood the surrounding rural areas to prevent Iraqi security
forces from getting into Fallujah.449 ISIS controls rural areas to the west and south of Baghdad.450
Currently, ISIS has Baghdad surrounded and is poised to move into Baghdad.451 ISIS has set up
loose administration, providing limited civil services, and loose justice systems in every territory that
434 Peter Bergen, A terror group too brutal for al-Qaeda, CNN (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/04/
opinion/bergen-al-qaeda-brutality-syria/.
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it holds.452 The United States has reportedly used surveillance drones over the Anbar province to
provide intelligence to the Iraqi forces.453 ISIS held onto territory in Syria between Raqqa and Deir
Ezzor after successfully pushing back al Nusra.454 ISIS aims to link this territory to the territory that
ISIS controls in Northern Iraq to facilitate movement between the two countries.455
Beginning in early May 2014, Zawahiri extended an olive branch to Baghdadi and called on
Baghdadi to leave Syria and return to Iraq.456 Zawahiri states that if ISIS returned to Iraq, al Qaeda
would welcome ISIS back as an affiliate.457 Zawahiri states that the expansion of ISI into ISIS has
led to Muslim bloodshed and a “political catastrophe for the people of the Levant”.458 Zawahiri
stated that ISIS has also benefitted Assad by dividing the Jihadist cause.459 Zawahiri called for ISIS
and other insurgencies to create a common sharia court to resolve their differences.460 On May 25,
2014, Zawahiri released another statement where he quoted a letter from Baghdadi from October
2012 in which Baghdadi called Zawahiri Emir and Sheikh, acknowledging Zawahiri’s authority and
Baghdadi states that ISIS was operating under the command of al Qaeda.461 Baghdadi has not
responded to Zawahiri’s offer to rejoin al Qaeda.462
analysis oF Phase 5:
During Phase 5, ISIS is operating as an autonomous insurgency and does not meet the
Johnson Standard of an associated force of al Qaeda. The United States could not use the AUMF
to target or detain ISIS members during phase 5. Although ISIS still meets the first requirement of
the Johnson Standard by maintaining its organization and continuing to launch armed attacks, ISIS
is no longer fighting in association with al Qaeda and is not fighting against the United States or its
coalition partners. As discussed in the analysis of phase 4, ISIS maintained its strong leadership
and organizational structure. ISIS’s structure allowed them to expand into new territory and to use
proto-state building techniques in the territory that they hold. ISIS’s continues to launch attacks
across Iraq and Syria. ISIS still meets the first requirement of the Johnson Standard.
The combination of ISIS disobeying al Qaeda, al Qaeda disavowing ISIS, and ISIS not
attacking U.S. or coalition forces make it impossible for ISIS to meet the second requirement of
the Johnson Standard. ISIS’s refusal to obey al Qaeda’s orders shows that ISIS does not want to
operate under al Qaeda’s command. Al Qaeda’s decision to formally disavow ISIS demonstrates that
452 Douglas Ollivant & Brian Fishman, State of Jihad: the reality of the islamic state in Iraq and Syria, war on the rocks
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al Qaeda does not want to be associated with ISIS’s brutal tactics. ISIS succeeded in building up its
reputation, procuring resources, planning and executing attacks, without the help of al Qaeda. ISIS
has become is own autonomous insurgency. Unless ISIS goes back towards relying on al Qaeda in
the future, there seems to be no way that the United States could use the AUMF to target ISIS in
Iraq or Syria. Although Zawahiri has offered ISIS to rejoin al Qaeda, Baghdadi and ISIS have not
indicated that they want to rejoin al Qaeda. Currently, ISIS has rejected al Qaeda and is no longer
fighting alongside al Qaeda. Further, ISIS is not fighting against U.S. or coalition forces as the
Johnson Standard requires. Currently, the United States could not use the AUMF to target or detain
ISIS members in either Iraq or Syria. ISIS would have to rejoin al Qaeda by obeying Zawahiri’s
order to return to attack and attack the United States or one of the coalition forces for the United
States to use the AUMF to target ISIS. Under the current condition, the United States would need
a separate Congressional authorization to attack ISIS either in Syria or Iraq. The United States can
still continue to provide military aid to Iraq to help Malaki combat ISIS.
conclusion
The difficulties in applying the Johnson Standard become apparent when analyzing AQI’s
development into ISIS. The group’s non-linear development and fluctuating relationship with al
Qaeda make it difficult to determine at what points ISIS is an associated force of al Qaeda. As the
phases of ISIS’s development reflected, when the group was weak and non-threatening, they relied
more heavily on al Qaeda for support, therefore meeting the Johnson test. However, when the
group became more powerful, it moved away from al Qaeda and focused on its own. This pattern
occurred under both Zarqawi and Baghdadi’s leadership. Applying the Johnson Standard showed
that when AQI/ ISIS was the most threatening, the United States did not have the authority to
combat them under the AUMF. However, when the group was weak and less of a threat to the
United States, the group more closely associated with al Qaeda and met the Johnson Standard. The
problem here is that the United States has no interest in targeting a terrorist organization when they
are weak and non-threatening. If the goal of incorporating the concept of co-belligerency into the
AUMF was to allow the United States to combat groups, like ISIS, that are affiliated with al Qaeda,
the Johnson Standard is not useful because it does not allow the United States to target the group
at its most threatening. When the group is most threatening, the United States would have to seek
an additional Congressional authorization or settle for providing aid to the host state to combat the
group. If this trend repeats itself with other al Qaeda affiliates, the United States will not be able to
use the AUMF to target al Qaeda affiliates when the United States would most need to.
Al Qaeda is experiencing a trend where is affiliated fluctuate in how heavily they rely on al
Qaeda. AQI’s development demonstrated that the group only turned to al Qaeda for help when the
group was weak and facing collapse. As al Qaeda’s affiliates gain control in their own regions, the
group does not want to submit to al Qaeda’s authority. When the affiliates no longer need al Qaeda
for support, the affiliates pursue their own goals and focus less on achieving al Qaeda’s mission. As
these groups expand it becomes more difficult for al Qaeda to control them from afar. Zawahiri’s
decision to disavow and disown ISIS showed just how little control al Qaeda had over ISIS. As al
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Qaeda’s affiliates break away from al Qaeda’s authority, the United States cannot rely on the AUMF
to combat these groups.
The Johnson Standard is not useful to the United States because it has no room for
fluctuation in the group’s association with al Qaeda and cannot be applied as the group becomes
more independent from al Qaeda. The Johnson Standard has no sort of timeframe or threshold
level of association with al Qaeda. As al Qaeda-linked groups fluctuate between relying more
heavily on al Qaeda and acting more independently, the United States will constantly have to reassess
whether the Johnson Standard is met and the group can be targeted under the AUMF. This puts
the United States in the precarious position of having to constantly evaluate the evidence to make
sure the group is still associated with al Qaeda and potentially putting the United States in the
position where it has to cease actions against a group as the group becomes more independent
from al Qaeda. If al Qaeda continues to lose control over its affiliates and these affiliates become
more independent, we will eventually reach a place where the associated forces doctrine is no longer
applicable at all. As these groups gain power and shirk off their allegiance to al Qaeda, the groups
can no longer be targeted under the AUMF. This creates a situation where many al Qaeda inspired
groups exist, but the United States does not have the authority to do any thing to target them. The
Johnson Standard is not well equipped to deal with fluctuations in al Qaeda’s relationship with its
affiliates.
If the United States wants to directly combat terrorist groups that are affiliated with al
Qaeda, the United States either needs to seek individual Congressional authorizations to do it or the
United States must be content to supply aid to the host states. Since the Johnson Standard does not
allow the United States to combat an al Qaeda affiliate when the group is the most threatening, the
United States must seek another legal basis if it wants to combat the group. The United States could
pro-actively seek individual Congressional authorizations to use force against each group. While
going to Congress for authorization to attack each al Qaeda affiliate would be cumbersome, it would
put the United States on a more solid legal foundation. The United States could also forgo the idea
of combatting al Qaeda affiliated groups all together. The United States could still provide military
aid to the host state where the group is operating to help the host state combat the group. If the
group ever directly attacked the United States, it could then go to Congress for an authorization to
use force in order to retaliate against the group. Any of these options would be a more solid legal
foundation than the United States’ current position.
Modern al Qaeda is far different from the group that attacked the United States on 9/11. Al
Qaeda is no longer one singular threat. Al Qaeda has evolved into a network of jihadist groups that
all share an ideology, but do not agree on the best way to achieve their collective goals. As al Qaeda
has splintered into an amorphous network, it has become increasingly difficult to determine which
of these cells constitute associated forces of al Qaeda. Making the analysis more difficult, recent
trends demonstrate that as al Qaeda linked cells develop, the groups become more autonomous and
independent from al Qaeda. This means that as groups become stronger and more threatening,
the groups also become less clearly associated with al Qaeda. The Johnson Standard is not well
equipped to analyze this type of constantly fluctuating threat. Under the Johnson Standard, the
United States would not be able to attack these groups at their most threatening when they become
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more independent from al Qaeda. If the United States determines that it is in their interest to
attack these groups, a new standard or a new Congressional authorization is needed that would
authorize the United States to do so regardless of the groups fluctuating relationship with al Qaeda.
Otherwise, the United States will have to accept that as the groups become more independent, the
United States will no longer be able to take action against them as associated forces of al Qaeda
under the AUMF.

